.1. Introduction

.Thickly curdling a field.

In the summer of 1991, I was fifteen and on route from my first trip to Europe with Dallas Fort/Worth Airport as my point of entry. The TSA was nonexistent, and security screening was done by low wage private contractors hired by the individual airline carriers per their terminal - federal oversight was the responsibility of the U.S. Customs Service. The basic security arrangement I was passing through had been routine since 1973 when the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) mandated inspection of carry-on baggage and scanning of all passengers (Aviation Security 1990). This measure was a response to the previous year's hijacking of Southern Airways Flight 49 by three men who threatened to fly the plane into a nuclear reactor at Oak Ridge National Laboratory, and would be instituted on August 5, 1974 with the anti-hijacking Air Transportation Security Act of 1974 being passed - "a landmark change in aviation security." I wrangled my checked bag and proceeded to screening. Most people had their passports inspected and then told to proceed to immigration, but a few others were asked to open their bags. The year before my trip, the 1990 Aviation Security Improvement Act was passed in response to the terrorist bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland (Aviation Security Improvement Act of 1990). Congressional findings contained in the Act assessed the then current aviation security system to be inadequate in addressing an emerging threat of aviation based terror and that immediate action should be taken to overhaul security measures (*Aviation Security* 1990).

The Act established the Aviation Security Advisory Committee (ASAC) - "created to examine areas of civil aviation security with the aim of developing recommendations for the improvement of civil aviation security, methods and procedures." Upon being signed into law, the Act also resulted in an array of new operational positions: it created a special position of Director of Intelligence and Security within the Department of Defense (DoD), as well as, a position of Assistant Administrator for Civil Aviation Security within the FAA who would be charged with the "tasks of day-to-day management and operations related to civil aviation security" (*Aviation Security*, 29). At the airport level, these tasks were to be

coordinated by the also newly created positions of "federal security manager" and "foreign security liaison officer" within the FAA. These latter two positions were in theory to oversee the screening protocol I was going through in 1991. The Act also mandated specific measures to be taken for strengthening airport security. Some of these were: tighter controls over checked baggage, controls over individuals with access to aircrafts, covert testing of security systems, improvements to x-ray equipment, measures for better passenger prescreening and requiring background checks for airport security personnel. So in 1991, I was witnessing these mandated "Improvements".

In fact, beyond creating the positions above, the Act delineated a lot more than it executed. By 1995, many critical assessments were levied on government efforts to address either the recommendations of the President's Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism, or even the mandates set forth in the Aviation Security Improvement Act itself. Cited deficiencies[1] explaining this were lack of funding, complex technical challenges that the FAA was inadequately equipped to manage, and the fact that attention to the task of implementing aviation security was instead focused on policy geared to the failings of oversight functions (the positions created by the Act instead of the changes it mandated and the advisory committee subsequently recommended). In other words, apart from some modest equipment upgrades (e.g., x-ray machines), the screening assemblage (still largely performed by private contractors) had changed little since 1974.

The pair of agents I was facing decided me to be a person of interest. I handed one my passport while the other dumped everything from my checked bag onto the table between us. The one with my passport mispronounced the name of my hometown, using a voiced palato-alveolar sibilant affricate "J" (or hard "J") rather than a voiceless velar fricative "J" (silent or X). If the reader does the latter now, you will both perform the indigenous name for the area I grew up in (the Kumeyaay called the area mat kulaaxuuy, or "land of holes") and telegraph the conclusion of my story. When the other agent found an unused pipe amongst my things, both began pressing me where the "stuff" is. Explaining to them that there was nothing to find proved futile. They told me to repack my bag (the contents of which had been recklessly dumped and searched through) and then accompany them to the

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1 President's Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism

back. Opening a door to (what I recall was) an empty room, they ushered me in, shut the door, told me to strip to my underwear, and then face the wall with my hands pressed flat on the wall. One agent proceeded to search me - first patting, then cupping and eventually vice gripping my scrotum. I viscerally turned wincing in pain to which he promptly ordered, "Face the wall, or I bloody it with your face." I obliged, him with his hand gripped where it was. Back then, airport security operations seemed incommensurate with respect to securing the border (from narcotics) and securing aviation transportation (from terror). Throughout the '90's, I could readily assume that most screening processes were going to involve some sort extra security work (thankfully, none like my Fort Worth experience).

The 9/11 terrorist attacks would, of course, dramatically change lots of things including airport security protocols. Trivially, security would be much easier for me. Less trivially, Congress passed the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA) on November 19, 2001, establishing the TSA - whom ASAC thereafter served. Less than a week later, On November 25, the Homeland Security Act of 2002 created the Department of Homeland Security. This would make (even more) all-encompassing what in 1991 was a more limited notion: "to secure the nation against the many [natural or manmade] threats we face" - border in the most extensive sense possible. This corpus of legislation would subsume all aviation security operations under a monolithic house of U.S. national security (overseeing 22 different federal agencies) instituted as the ongoing project known as the Homeland Security Enterprise (Bellavita 2011). Today, the previous equivalency between border and aviation security is not only assumed, but also continuous, and perhaps for less expected reasons. Rather than the border simply becoming a vulnerability for dangerous flows of terror, terror has become a phenomenon independent of its totality of extensions - Terrorism and insurgencies have become interchangeable, and in 2010, then U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, told the Council on Foreign Relations that the violence by the "DTOs" (Drug Trafficking Organizations) in Mexico were perhaps "morphing into, or making common cause with, what we would call an insurgency." Possibly a strange inversion enters into Clinton's rendering of the chaotic or asymmetric disorder (that has proven so effective) usually characterizing insurgencies as something formulaic: both differentially continuous

in their morphogenesis and axiomatic in their tautological definition in "what we would call" them.

Security, Securitization and Performance Studies

In a 2008 essay, the International Relations scholar Mark B. Salter examined the Canadian variation on the ATSA/TSA/HSA assemblage in the U.S. that I've just given a glimpse of. Salter's aim was more interpretive, characterizing the complex security politics that differentially modulated the multiple institutional sites in which debates over post 9/11 passenger screening protocols played out in Canada. To keep track of the different discursive contexts, Salter turned to Erving Goffman and deployed a dramaturgical model that could parse the different contextual dynamics by viewing security politics as "determined by the actors and their roles, the rules of the discourse permissible within that space, and the expectations of the audience" (Salter, 329). Within Goffman's sociological construct, security screening is investigated with a theatrical vocabulary describing how security stages a social setting, and distributes interactional roles therein such that relevant players can be dynamically tracked as ongoing performances of identity (Salter, 328). Salter also appealed to Goffman's dramaturgical framework in order to leverage the analysis of security dramas that unfold in specific discursive arrangements that characterize "the mutual constitution of self and audience." To make sense of the politics of a security performance then is to characterize how it presupposes and communicates "the ground-rules for who may speak, what may be said, and what is heard" (329). Salter distributed the security politics of passenger screening debates in four different settings: national, organizational, bureaucratic, or scientific. In addition to Goffman's framework, Salter also leveraged two additional resources familiar to performance studies: the speech act theory of J.L. Austin and the notion of "regime of truth" advanced by Michel Foucault ("Truth and Power" 1980). Together, these resources gave Salter a dramaturgical model that offered:

> more nuanced understanding of audience-speaker co-constitution of author-
> ity and knowledge, the weight of social context, and the degree of success of
> (de)securitization. This dramaturgical analysis, then, does not abstract the speech

act from its sociopolitical or organizational context, but rather situates the secu-

ritizing move in a particular local "regime of truth," in a particular setting and

in time (Foucault 1980). Four different settings explain variations in the form,

content, and success of speech acts: the popular, the elite, the technocratic, and

the scientific. In each of these different settings, the core rules for authority/-

knowledge (who can speak), the social context (what can be spoken), and the

degree of success (what is heard) vary. This goes far beyond linguistic rules

towards norms and conventions of discourse, as well as bureaucratic politics,

group identity, collective memory, and self-defined interest. (321-322)

Salter's text gives me more than a Canadian/U.S. aviation security coincidence. His study takes place within a broader set of debates between scholars who have collectively sought to study how security conditions socio-political relations. The shared starting point for these scholars is departing from the conventional organization of security as a professional academic field of inquiry. Salter advocated for a dramaturgical framework as a proposed resolution to one particular axis of this debate.

In the U.S. and Britain, the academic study of security is usually positioned as a primary area within the broader discipline of International Relations. In this conventional form, the field of study is narrowly focused on nation-states as the central analytic referents and the strategic use of military force as the subject of study. Alternatively, the subject of study can be inversely defined in terms of threat - "how do states use force in pursuit of power?" versus "how and why states respond to military threats?." This enables security to be simultaneously defined: (i) as a relative measure of military power between nation-states, and (ii) as a measure of statecraft representing the military dimension for pursuing the 'national interest' (Grand Strategy).

Over the last two decades however, a critical subfield has begun to establish itself as an alternative to narrowly defined state- and military-based conceptions of security analysis. Initially, critical approaches to security studies endeavored to semantically debase the tradi-tional concept of security by either deepening or widening the subject of study. Deepening meant refocusing analysis to the ontological priority of security to serve humans rather than nation-states that are reified into rational actors. Widening alternatively meant including

sectors other than the military to be relevant for analyzing security issues. More recently, a number of critical security scholars have argued that analysis should move beyond these conceptual debates in order to attend to more empirically situated issues.

One such scholar is Ole Wæver, whose work has proved to be another productive voice in the debate on security studies. Informed by constructivism, poststructuralism, and critical theory more generally, Wæver's theory of securitization displaces analysis of security as an instrumental response to objective threats by instead attending to the structures and processes that make it possible to perceive something as a security problem as such (Wæver 1998). Following Wæver's initial articulation, securitization studies branched into two approaches: some have followed Wæver's original articulation of the theory that positions speech act theory at the core of what constitutes a security problem, while others have instead invested in a sociological perspective to focus on how threats emerge, sometimes in the absence of any discursive design, through everyday practices, material processes and power relations. In addition, Wæver acknowledges Marina Sbisà as informing his development of securitization by "rereading" Austin's *How To Do Things with Words* to retain the book's full revolutionary potential. I will pause to elaborate a more detailed picture of Wæver and Sbisà's positions, before addressing a contemporary impasse increasingly challenging the theory's notion of the 'act' that some argue enable the theory's condition for the political critique of security.

In the article, "Securitization and Desecuritization" (1998), Wæver made Austin's speech-act theory the core basis for analyzing security as a discursive construction of threat. The theory became associated with the Copenhagen School theory of securitization due to the geographical circumstance of the theory's next appearance in the book, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, that Wæver co-authored with Barry Buzan and Jaap de Wilde. While earlier scholars of securitization essentially defined security as a speech act, the focus of these authors was on security as an intersubjective act involving "a securitizing actor acting towards a significant audience" (Stritzel, 363). Matt McDonald has emphasized how Wæver's initial articulation was, in essence, a linguistic theory:

> For the Copenhagen School, issues become security issues (or more accurately threats) through language. It is language that positions specific actors or issues as existentially threatening to a particular political community, thus enabling

(or indeed constituting, depending on interpretation) securitization. Indeed, rather than simply being one 'site' of security construction, Wver (1995) located securitization itself in language theory, and particularly Austin's articulation of the 'speech act'. In this framework, language itself becomes security in the sense that particular forms of language - spoken or written in a particular context - constitute security. (McDonald, 568)

As a theory of language, a security speech act was one performed by a political elite, seen to have some authority to speak security, and in doing so, designating a particular issue as an existential threat. A felicitous securitization of some issue legitimates emergency measures beyond normal politics in order to manage that issue. In the context of airport screening protocols for instance, rather than understanding the mandate for passengers to remove their shoes as a security response to the threat that Reid (the shoe bomber) posed, as a speech-act, 'shoes' were designated an existential threat (by someone with authority) felicitating the use of extraordinary screening measures. This example points to the traditional side of securitization theory - securitizing shoes in the airport is a case of consensus. Perhaps thornier is Clinton's designation of "DTOs" as becoming-insurgent insofar as legitimating the same military measures used to combat insurgencies (e.g., advocating domestic counter-insurgency operations?).

In contrast to this, McDonald argued that Wæver's speech act theory of securitization later suffered an internal tension when emphasis was placed on analyzing the consequences of security as an intersubjective act. In other words, the later theory of securitization emphasizes security as a perlocutionary act with observable causal effects rather than implicit conventional acts whose illocutionary force may not be immediately observable. In addition to this internal tension within the theory, McDonald argued that the Copenhagen School approach to securitization is "problematically narrow in three basic senses": (i) the form of act is defined narrowly as speech by political elites, (ii) the act's context is defined narrowly as the instantaneous moment of the utterance, and (iii) "the nature of the act is defined solely in terms of the designation of threats to security" (564). Narrowness in the first sense excludes both "other forms of representation (images or material practices, for example)" and speakers other than institutionally legitimated political actors. The second

sense of narrowness ignores the "potential for security to be constructed over time" and through a range of incremental processes and representations. This approximates the notion of performativity advanced by Judith Butler. Finally, the narrowness of the third sense "suggests that security acquires content only through representations of danger and threat" and as such "encourages a conceptualization of security politics as inherently negative and reactionary" (McDonald, 564). In short, the speech-act theory of securitization is problematic for it's privileging of linguistic acts that are instantaneous and exceptional rather than inclusive of non-verbal, material and routinized processes. Wæver (2011) has responded to this and other criticism by arguing that he originally conceived something more extensive than security as merely linguistic act.

Wæver's subsequent writings defended his position by invoking Sbisà's (2002, 2006, 2007) radical reading of Austin. More specifically, he noted that conventional readings of Austin re-establish the "divide between language and action" and in the process lose the "radical potential of Austin's theory" by removing "everything social from the illocutionary," reducing the illocutionary act to communication and "thus - against Austin's original intent - remov[ing] the possibility that speech can be really action." Like Sbisà, Wæver views speech as action that is not communicating intention, but distributes modality in a "non-normal." Sbisà (2002, 2006, 2007) argued against the readings of John Searle and his followers, who diminished the notion of performativity. She traced the tensions between Austin and Searle to their different conceptions of an act. In Searle's cognitive version, an act amounts to "a psycho-physical gesture on the part of an individual". To obtain the full import of Sbisà's argument that the received, or conflated, interpretations of Austin obscure a radical potential in his theory, we need to understand her more general conception of speech-acts as "context-changing social actions". In "Speech acts in context" (2002), she argued that subsequent developments of speech act theory fail to have "duly appreciated" Austin's conception of context. This reduces speech-acts to communicative intentions rather than the full-fledged actions she believes Austin posited them to be. Alternatively, in the perspective she proposed contexts are understood as actually situated evaluative functions that are,

> continuously shifting, but at each moment of an interaction it is possible to
> evaluate the performed speech acts against the context set by the goals of the

interaction considered so far. Contexts are also continuously changing, not only because non-verbal actions or events make actual circumstances change, but also because speech acts themselves bring about changes in the conventional features of the context, notably those regarding rights, obligations, entitlements, commitments of the participants. (Sbisà, "Speech acts in context", 434)

This means that context is never completely given, but rather minimally constructed in the scene. It also means that action, or the performance of any speech act, requires a social environment.

In a subsequent work, "Communicating citizenship in verbal interaction" (2006), Sbisà more specifically characterized Austinian illocutionary acts as performing three functions (154):

(I) describing how the intersubjective relationship between the interlocutors is changed by the successful performance of the act;

(II) producing these conventional effects only if there is intersubjective agreement about the fact that they have been produced;

(III) and being recognizable in the illocutionary force-indicating-devices that manifest some by-default, tacit agreement.

In the same work, she then extended Austin's characterization of illocutionary acts into a tentative theory of communicative acts.

Participants in communicative events coordinate their courses of behavior, thus making collaborative action possible. Coordination requires the shaping of each agent as playing a role in the interpersonal relationship. In their communicative acts, participants present themselves and recognize each other as endowed with rights, obligations, legitimate expectations, commitments, knowledge-that and knowledge-how, cognitive and volitional attitudes. They also affect the local statuses of one another, confirming or modifying them. Transmission of knowledge itself is rooted in this broader dimension of interpersonal action. (156)

Like Salter, Sbisà turned to Goffman for characterizing the "who" and "whom" of a social interaction in his sociological/theatrical indices of "animator" ("the individual providing psychophysical resources for gestures or utterances"), "author" (" the individual or group of individuals on whom the choice of gestures or words depends") and the "principal" (the projected self constituted during social interaction that is ascribed responsibility for action) (156-157).

In the spirit of Sbisà's reading, Wæver emphasized analyzing securitization as an illocutionary act. In that way, the theory is organized "around the constitutive, transformative event of actors reconfiguring the relationship of rights and duties rather than seeing an external cause-effect relationship between speech and effects". He interprets Searle as watering down Austin's theory by opening a gap between language and action. In a more recent article, "The theory act: Responsibility and exactitude as seen from securitization" (2015), he argued that lost in this gap is the:

> radical potential of Austin's theory is lost when these traditionalists separate everything social from the illocutionary, and de facto reduces the illocutionary act to communication, and thus - against Austin's original intent - removes the possibility that speech can be really action. We witness surprisingly, the contrast between saying and doing, reborn within the very context of speech-act theory. (123)

In the same issue of *Security Dialogue* that Wæver's 2011 paper appears in, Jef Huysmans endorses the former's speech-act theory of security as being unique among other linguistic approaches for "expressing a more recognizable political investment" ("What's in an Act?", 371-372). Missing however, Huysmans argued, is attention to and elaboration of the theory's animating notion of the 'act' that both expresses both its conception of the political as well as "conditions the political critique of security practice that is possible" by the theory (372). What has been emphasized instead are questions related to discourse and speech such as "the ontological status of language, discourse as methodology, speech acts as a particular form speech and rhetorical structures and grammars of security speech" (372). He accordingly argues for re-engaging the notion of the 'act' that is at work in Wæver's theory of securitization. By asking (in the essay's title) "What's in an act?," Huysmans is both asking a

question and raising a challenge. In re-engaging the notion of 'act' in the theory, Huysmans reaches an impasse in what he calls our contemporary moment of increasing "little security nothings" - the ways in which security increasingly functions through technically mediated, dispersed, automated and associative securitizing protocols and technologies (376). Put simply, "little security nothings" induce insecurities without binding any recognizable actor to a decisional moment. In other words, little security nothings are etiolated deontic modal competences - contracts without signatures, "I do's" without avowals.

"Little security nothings" signal an impasse for binding "answerability" to an actor when a decision to act is effaced. Worse, in our contemporary moment of "little security nothings" that obscure any clear boundary between everyday and exceptional politics, the third form of "answerability" is hopelessly undecidable:

> The loss of decisional gravitation and of a separation between the everyday and the exceptional challenge the notion of exceptionalist rupture that is embedded in the speech act of security. The concept of rupture draws attention to a fixed frame of reference, a given order that has been able to aggregate a multiplicity of practices, subjects and objects into a whole expressing a particular rationale. The rupture is an event that demonstrates the existence of order and its limits by breaking the 'habitual'. (377)

The impasse of little security nothings therefore forces us to uncover the buried decision, or the now free-floating (dispersed, automated and infinitely associative) (perhaps projected) deictic operator. We need contextual alignment for the little nothings.

Thesis Statement

My thesis inhabits much of the disciplinary setting discussed above, but with a different objective. I have chosen to hone my thesis statement from the specter of "little security nothings" for two related reasons: (i) it constitutes a provocative challenge for critical security studies more broadly than the theory of securitization, and (ii) it presents a useful challenge to the claims of other fields, including performance studies. Huysmans pluralizes nothing,

providing a provocation for work within that logical tension. But as my study progresses, I'll examine the substantiation of "little security nothings" in a series of concrete settings which, ironically, exponentiates - precisely - *nothing* - but, in earnest, or in appearance to, hopefully arrive somewhere near nothing.

Having left Huysmans's impasse underspecified allows me to evoke the specter of nothingness more implicitly by instead emphasizing notions of 'the act.' Each of my four chapters does this by diffracting sometimes attractive, sometimes repulsive and other times simply awry notions of an act. In addition to the notion of act signified (or effaced) by little security nothings, a major analytic I leverage is what the artist/activist Ricardo Dominguez referred to as acts that are "concurrently effective and affective." In Dominguez's sense of concurrency, it means that projects should aim for "having strong, concrete outcomes to the conditions that have failed or are failing to create the spaces necessary for a community to be sustainable in any number of ways". In other words, projects should be effective, and thus are subject to a law of accountability. Effective also means implementing technology that works, and are experimental in the sense of scientifically verifiable (by implication also open to failure). The latter translates into conceiving critique as not merely given, but needs to be verified empirically.

Alternatively, the aesthetic sense of experiment is obtained by the affective, where Dominguez locates a "disturbance in the 'Law' to the degree that it cannot easily contain the 'break' and it is forced to enter into another conversation - a conversation that power as-enforcement may not want to have." The notion of 'Law' here I take to locate a field of veridiction, or the complex obverse to a law of effective accountability. The notion of an act as concurrently effective/affective then is a theme that differentially appears in each chapter. In addition to that concurrency, another theme spanning the thesis is what Donna Haraway introduced as a diffractive method that in contrast to reflexive methods, prefers to attend to interferences. Rather than use term diffractive specifically (it shows up variously as superposition, interference, convolution, and otherwise), like "little security nothings," diffraction is both a heuristic device and an object of analysis in several of the sites the thesis visits.

Among the significant little nothings, and concurrencies that I consider throughout the thesis are: clandestine listening and vibrationally hearing, engineering delocative possibilities, state secrets and blank spots, a human persona hidden in a logical contradiction, storing missing records and modulating the subjective experience of being HOME. More succinctly, in this thesis I examine some ways that tiny little security impasses have been challenged aesthetically, institutionally, and operationally, as well as engineered, interfered with, and algebratized.

Literature Review

By examining, via security studies, what J.L. Austin put forward in *How to do things with Words*, I revisit with a new perspective Shoshana Felman's seminal text, *The Scandal of the Speaking Body: Don Juan with J. L. Austin, or Seduction in Two Languages*. Felman provides a productive point of departure in reviewing foundational texts in performance studies, and she is perhaps foremost among important precedents for my thesis. There are also less obvious ways that Felman's anticipates and dialogues with my thesis than this Austinian circumstance. Before delivering these, I'll begin by eliciting one possible Austinian conversation between Felman, Sbisà and Wæver.

Among the stronger points of contact is their departure from the "received" Austin. Recall that Sbisà's basis for first reinterpreting and then extending Austin's writing was to argue that his book was structured as a complex proof by contradiction - a particular form of *reductio absurdum* proving a proposition indirectly by first claiming its opposite and then demonstrating how it leads to an impasse (or an obstinate veridiction). Sbisà is somewhat ambiguous however, when she also refers to Austin's constative category as a "straw man" - a fallacy reducing a counter position to absurdity by deploying a distorted variant of that position. Her ambiguity is not unproductive. One popular gloss on earnestly deploying a straw man is in believing that by doing violence to a distorted portrait of someone, one is causing physical injury to that person. Felman, of course, offers her own extensive revision of Austin. Also like Sbisà, Felman displaces the received polemics of constative/performative, speech/practice, linguistics/philosophy, etc. For the latter however, rather than a complex

proof by contradiction, Austin's book is a complex denial - alternatively, a "denegation," proof of "radical negativity," a scandalized proof, or the proof of scandal. In Felman's own words, the 'fallible' is not itself 'infallible' (103). Which is to say that, radical negativity somehow oscillates between the affirmation of a proof by contradiction and is open to anaphora by starting over in another iteration of that proof (disproving that very same performance to prove): "Thus negativity, fundamentally fecund and affirmative, and yet without positive reference, is above all that which escapes the negative/ positive alternative" (Felman, 104). A different straw man is sitting at the helm. Let me proceed a little more systematically.

First, what are the possible convergences besides, or out of, Felman's scandalized and Sbisà's contradictory interpretations of Austin? Like Sbisà's Austin, Felman delivers by way of a straw man encountered in the conclusion of her compact book. There, and similar to Sbisà, Felman speculates a distorted progeny in the form of an Aristotelian paradox. More specifically, Felman perceives an historical misfire: the critics who first reprimanded Austin for not taking proper care of the performative/constative distinction that he brought home also scolded him for not taking non-seriousness seriously enough. For this, Felman suggests, they sought to normalize his theory, and in so doing, missed the non-seriousness of what he was doing:

> However, when Austin says, using his favorite first-person rhetoric, "I must not be joking, for example,?" is it certain that we must - that we can - believe him? Coming from a jester like Austin, might not that sentence itself be taken as a denegation - as a joke? Is Austin joking or not, when he says "I must not be joking, for example"? Critics who reproach Austin for excluding jokes, on the basis of the Austinian statement, are failing to take into account the Austinian act, failing to take into account the close and infinitely complex relationship maintained, throughout Austin's work, between the theory and jokes. What the critics of Austinian "seriousness," of his exclusion of joking, do, paradoxically, is exclude his joking - they fail to take it seriously. We end up here, historically speaking, at the heart of the Aristotelian paradox. (95)

Later, Felman delivers this distortion more succinctly, writing that the received Austin is only historically received by way of a theoretical misfire - "through a denegation both of his act and of his humor" (99).

In the foreword of the 2002 English publication of Felman's book, Stanley Cavell seems to put this in terms more resolute with Sbisà's proof by contradiction, if not also with her straw arming, when he took the effect of "the dominating coup of Felman's reading" to be how promising, a deontic modal, like the third form of answerability, that makes 'I promise' the condition for speech. In Felman's alignment of Austin's promising the performative/constative distinction and Don Juan's promise of marriage, Cavell found a conjunct of knowing and promising that privileges the latter, "naming as it were the fact of speech itself." For Cavell, the notion of 'act' "identifies speaking as giving one's word, as if an 'I promise' implicitly lines every act of speech, of intelligibility, as it were a condition of speech as such. (Kant held that 'I think' is such a lining.)" (viii).

I develop neither the possible connections of Felman's attention to promising and Sbisà's deontic modal competence, nor those between a complex proof by negation and Austin's "radical negativity"; but only suggest that some philosophical import might be possible there. In this country's current political moment, there is likely some political import there.[2]

Rather than explore those possibilities, I would like instead to mention an unexpected perspective on how Felman's book, or its paratext really, anticipated a pair of works by the American artist Jill Magid that I discuss in chapter four of this thesis. In the preface to its 2002 English edition, Felman reminds us that her book, first published in French (1980) under the title *Le Scandale du corps parlant*, received its first English translation four years later under the title, *The Literary Speech Act*. It was Felman herself that suggested this translation - perhaps to emphasize the literature/philosophy polemic, but as Judith Butler pointed out in the 2nd English edition, that emphasis "lost the body" of Felman's book (113).

In chapter four I follow Jill Magid in losing three bodies - one effaced, one removed and another hidden in a logical impossibility (or under "radical negativity"). Like Felman (Austin

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2 One obvious case would be taking Wæver's leveraging of Sbisà's deontic modal competence in order to ascribe "answerability" and defeasibility to a political elite speaking security to, say, a (or soon, the singular) political elite that speak of extraordinary border security measures in reference to some 'existential threat' (we need a "big wall" to keep "rapists" out). Alternatively, it seems urgent to bind "answerability" to identical elites that desecuritize climate change).

and Don Juan) seduction is important for Magid's work, and like the former constellation, is also compelled by a performative speech-act - a directive. Chapter four could be reread as a mystery: We find one body not there, not anywhere (wherever one expects to find it) but nonetheless proceed to look for it (there between its covers). We discover another one returned on a promise, but *having-being* breached, only partially viewable, and written in spilled ink. The third is nowhere to be found - its only residue an amalgamated *illocution*, partially directive, partially commissive (or perhaps simply a recurred exercitive of the "authority to remove" - first asserted to Magid, and then by Magid) that Austin categorized as "an assertion of influence or exercising of power" (Austin, 163). Each of these portraits could be equally exchanged for the other two missing bodies, however, the one suggestive of Felman's original English title is Magid's novel, *Becoming Tarden* (2009). Having been confiscated by a Dutch intelligence agency, its only accessible parts are Magid's prologue and epilogue, but nothing hanging between (no body-in-the-middle). Magid's novel appears to once again locate us at deontic modality.

Diffracting into creeping wave

Like many other performance studies works, my thesis cuts across a number of disciplinary (and otherwise) boundaries. In order to further review some existing performance studies texts that are important precedents for what I tried to do in the thesis, in addition to Felman, I have culled together four more scholars that mutually inform one another?s work, as well as my own. Some of the empirical sites they have engaged are densely technical, and each invests in a method that is against the grain without being either trivial or dismissive. I strive do something similar in this thesis. Like them, I often appeal to underspecified formal devices. Of the five scholars I identify, only one is directly named in the body of the thesis. I mean to evoke the ways their presence is implied, or could have been resolutely manifest in the thesis. By returning to Felman, I will pick up a theme and then thicken into a thread weaving/radiating the individual works into a constellation.

In her book, Felman characterized of Benveniste's view of the performative as "an exhaustive specularity" that produces a "perfect symmetry between meaning and reference" and

that is itself symmetrical to that holding "between statement and utterance" (53). In contrast, Felman argued that Austin similarly perceived the self-referentiality of the performative, but as an asymmetrical condition in which an utterance exceeds its statement because the performative in referring to itself is not instantaneous, but returns to its statement to act as an interference. The self-interference of the performative lies in the cut of a"referential excess, an excess on the basis of which the real leaves its trace on meaning" (53-54). Felman rejected the self-referentiality of the performative as a reflective condition where what one is stating, the other is doing simultaneously because:

> the real is not the negative reflection - the symmetrical opposite - of the specular: the two are *knotted together*. The self-reflexiveness of consciousness, the linguistic self-referentiality of subjectivity no longer refer to an identity, but to a referential residue, to a performative excess. (55)

A distinction between specular reflection and diffractive interference will guide us below. Donna Haraway has also rejected specularity, preferring instead a more knotted and situated way of thinking she introduced in the optical notion of diffraction. Trained as a biologist, Haraway works in the intersections of biology and techno-science, as well as, ecology, feminist theory and cultural studies. Fundamental to her work in these intersections is her putting their disciplinary concerns they situate as academic projects directly in the service of the political projects they can also situate outside the academia.

One of her most sustained methodological endeavors emerges in her suspicion of reflection as an epistemological trope, and its often uncritical translation into a principle of reflexivity that alleges to place the researcher in relation to research and its effects. Instead of an optics of reflection, Haraway appeals to an optics of diffraction as a methodological notion. In (Haraway 1997) for instance, she called for a "self-critical technoscience committed to situated knowledges" (33) by narrating a seemingly impossible series of sites with a scope anticipated by the book's title. One possible trajectory through this series is, "chip, gene, seed, fetus, database, bomb, race, brain, ecosystem" (11).

In the first chapter, she introduces the three syntactical marks appearing in the title as affordances enabling different accesses and orientations to the "historical hyperspace called technoscience" (3). These marks effectively modalize that hyperspace into different

discursive arrangements. The '@' and '.', for instance, signify the Net that, Haraway points out, originated as a communicative platform in the context of defense research and development projects. By the same token, the '' and '?' mark the relational syntax of "natural/social/technical congealed into property,? but also enable Haraway an analytics of "artifactual chimeras." They are "little ornaments" for exploring questions of "what kinds of bodies, what forms of frozen as well as motile sociotechnical alliances, also called social relationships" they made possible (7).

Above, I noted that Felman indicates how reflective methodologies privilege specular mirroring, and as such, fail to come to terms with the complex and excessive negativity of Austin's performative. Haraway similarly views reflexivity as deficient for critical practice. The latter writes:

> Reflexivity has been recommended as a critical practice, but my suspicion is that reflexivity, like reflection, only displaces the same elsewhere, setting up worries about copy and original and the search for the authentic and really real?What we need is to make a difference in material-semiotic apparatuses, to diffract the rays of technoscience so that we get more promising interference patterns on the recording films of our lives and bodies. Diffraction is an optical metaphor for the effort to make a difference in the world?Diffraction patterns record the history of interaction, interference, reinforcement, difference. Diffraction is about heterogeneous history, not about originals. Unlike reflections, diffractions do not displace the same elsewhere, in more or less distorted form . . . Rather, diffraction can be a metaphor for another kind of critical consciousness at the end of this rather painful Christian millennium, one committed to making a difference and not to repeating the Sacred Image of Same . . . . Diffraction is a narrative, graphic, psychological, spiritual, and political technology for making consequential meanings (273)

Using diffraction and other methodological displacements, Haraway's work is foundational for the study of the interactions between science, technology and culture, as well as, the heterogeneous circumstances of industry and science. My thesis follows her into these same settings, and in so doing, I have tried to proceed through analysis with a critical hope - *critical*

in not taking the given as granted, and *hopeful* in investigating what other possibilities might be conceivable. In "A Cyborg Manifesto," first published in *Socialist Review* in 1985, Haraway sought to ask new political possibilities for doing critical theory. The essay anticipates the second chapter in this thesis where I discuss a collectively authored manifesto that attempted something similar by critical security scholars.

Haraway's manifesto was motivated by her unwillingness to do biology without paying attention to "the radical historicity of these objects of knowledge" ("When We Have Never Been Human", 136). The essay came out of her refusing a narrow category of 'life' by instead proceeding from a more complex field of materiality - from the speciation of "the various non-humans on the scene." The manifesto was also a challenge to feminism to consider the cyborg as a possibility that "We are all chimeras, theorized and fabricated hybrids of machine and organism; in short" (*Simians, Cyborgs, and Women*, 150).

Haraway's essay "Situated Knowledges" (1991) is another text relevant to my thesis. When she challenges humanism as perpetuating the 'god-trick' that affirms 'man' the capacity of "seeing everything from nowhere" (189), she anticipates the works I discuss in chapters three and four. In the third chapter of my thesis, I discuss how the artist Trevor Paglen troubles both a similar trick for 'seeing everything from nowhere', and the specular claim of photography through the link of an image's particular historicity of material production to it's the resulting defamiliarizing effect. In chapter four, Jill Magid challenges the "god trick" of observational technologies that presuppose objectivity by instead locating subjectivities that these technologies exclude.

Haraway's more recent effort in advancing "nonhumanism," and its related cladogenesis in companionship that includes cyborgs as "junior siblings in the much bigger, queer family of companion species" ("Cyborgs to Companion Species," 300), productively complicates a question encountered in the second chapter, "where does the human stop?". In the chapter, I rehearse the debate over how the human agenda situates questions of universality and emancipation. Some critical security scholars suggested how the question of "where does the human stop?" could be useful if posed not philosophically (or biologically), but politically. Haraway's conjecture of "nonhumanism" provides a possible answer not as a temporal break, nor categorical boundary, but more as a variant on the sorites paradox (from the

Greek soros for 'heap') that is also known as a 'little-by-little' aporia arising due to the indeterminacy within the limits of predication. Haraway might also prefer to answer using a species of dialetheism. Another Haraway text that seems particularly germane to my thesis is her essay "The Promises of Monsters: A Regenerative Politics for Inappropriate/d Others" (Grossberg, et al, 1992). Haraway begins the essay by declaring it "a mapping exercise and travelogue" through an "impossible but all-too-real present, in order to find an absent, but perhaps possible, other present." She thus evokes her previous manifesto, as well as, the calls for other possibilities of political being/being political that my thesis discusses. Her hope is to speculate (factual) nature as "elsewhere" by deploying "a little siting device" expressing a "diminutive" theory by producing optical effects of "connection, of embodiment, and of responsibility for an imagined elsewhere that we may yet learn to see and build here." Her "little siting device? (with its dissonance / resonance with Huysmans's "little security nothings") is a diffractive device that happily goes awry of what she calls the "hyper-productionism and enlightenment" that reproduces its own reflection.

My thesis attends to moments of, precisely, the "sitings" of *nothings*. At the beginning of chapter three, I locate Trevor Paglen in the basement of Berkeley's McCone Hall where he is researching the university's collection of U.S. geological surveys. He discovers that, like the body of Magid's novel, "vast swaths of land" were missing from the geographic record. These holes in the record eventually mutate into black plates that read, "Frames Edited from Original Negative" (Paglen, Blank Spots, 4). These blank spots pointed to a different breed of siting device that Paglen began to study in earnest. In a meditative essay he wrote shortly after discovering the world of 'black sites', he accounted for the historical lineage of those blank spaces as the strategic use of missing, or dissembled, cartographic data during the so-called age of discovery. Later, those blank spots would twice discursively mutate into U.S. policy: first during 'manifest destiny' when blank spots located the frontier and operated as unexplored 'exercitives' (both ascribing a right to annex the west, and asserting an obligation to tame the west) what was possible by "taming the west", and signifying the frontier as manifest destiny; and later, as the purview of the executive branch, an 'exercitive' to keep secrets. Paglen asserts a different performative to the latter.

In *How we became posthuman: virtual bodies in cybernetics, literature, and informatics* (1999), N. Katherine Hayles characterized the historical effect of the period immediately following WWII when the theories of control, information and cognition first came be studied as a single research field under the name of cybernetics. More specifically, in this historical context, she wanted to "show what had to be elided, suppressed, and forgotten" to make it possible for "information lose its body." In looking for the omitted materiality, Hayles also suggested a variation on Felman's anticipation of the removed body of Magid's book when Hayles introduced her book in performative terms as a "rememory" for, hopefully, "putting back together parts that have lost touch with one another and reaching out toward a complexity too unruly to fit into disembodied ones and zeros" (13). Hayles's text is perhaps the first and most extensive work on cybernetics that has been foundational for performance studies. Her text is also an important precedent for my thesis in examining the historical circumstances, or the cultural-technical-scientific helix that enabled cybernetics to emerge around the same time as information theory and the development of the first digital computers. Moreover, Hayles precedes me in several specific sites within that historical and theoretical setting that cybernetics in many ways centrally inhabited.

A succinct statement of what Hayles's primary question was in *How we became posthuman*, would be: "How did this historical circumstance make it possible to refer to consciousness without requiring that it be embodied?" Norbert Wiener, widely held to be the father of cybernetics, had spurred Hayles, she wrote, when he "proposed it was theoretically possible to telegraph a human being" (1). Her discovery of Wiener in turn pointed her to the larger disciplinary network radiating out from him that spanned "cybernetics, information theory, autopoiesis, computer simulation, and cognitive science" (2). Hayles summarized her wider context of inquiry that "began taking shape as three interrelated stories":

> The first centers on how *information* lost its body, that is, how it came to be conceptualized as an entity separate from the material forms in which it is thought to be embedded. The second story concerns how *the cyborg was created as a technological artifact and cultural icon* in the years following World War II. The third, deeply implicated with the first two, is the unfolding story of how

a historically specific construction called *the human is giving way to a different construction called the posthuman* (2)

With Hayles, we are diffracting with Haraway's alternative cyborg and unhuman, as well as with Felman's scandalized body (and Magid?s missing body of her novel). I organize my first chapter around the same historical and institutional circumstances that the three stories above unfold in, but instead narrate how cybernetics and the field of security studies coemerged in these settings. The story of security studies narrates the disembodiment of a specific nation-state to become referable as a much more generalized, scalar and rational entity. Alternatively, chapter four tells the story of a set of entities that are a single complementary entity in the sense that Hayles wanted - only partially viewable and referable as either data or material, but never both simultaneously. In this sense, it is like Austin's limit of the "total speech-act" to partial views: a material act, a conventional act, or a material effect. Hayles's defines her "posthuman subject" as "an amalgam, a collection of heterogeneous components, a material-informational entity whose boundaries undergo continuous construction and reconstruction" (3). Like "the Organization" that Magid encounters (chapter four), Hayles's liberal humanist subject/cybernetic posthuman possesses a body, but is not representable as such - e.g., possible approximations are locutionary bodies such as "He speaks like he is choking..." and notional bodies such as "She is the incarnation of the reclining nude...", but never as complete/d acts.

Whereas Austin seduced Felman, Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick and Adam Frank were "addicted to reading [Silvan] Tomkins". In their article, "Shame in the Cybernetic Fold: Reading Silvan Tomkins" (1995), they describe this addiction as a 'conjoint' of their "affect-effects" that "excited and calmed, inspired and contented" (498). Sedgwick and Frank discovered Tomkins while they were researching the psychological and therapeutic literature on the subject of shame. Not only did they find Tomkins uniquely productive in that research, Sedgwick and Frank also encountered a distaste for what they perceived to be the current habits to theorize in binaries. They therefore sought Tomkins's writings as way to challenge 'theory'.

Tomkins needed Norbert Wiener's early cybernetic writings in order to perceive affect as amplifying a multiplicity that in turn drives Freud's "paper tiger", the "id". Sedgwick and Frank describe the effect of this particular analytic structure on understanding sexuality:

"as a drive remains characterized here by binary (potent/impotent) model, yet its link to attention, to motivation, or indeed to action occurs only through 'co-assembly' with an affect system described as encompassing several more, and more qualitatively different, possibilities than on/off" (504). In other words, they wrote, underlying a digital computation is a differentiated analog representational process. They honed a "tacit homology" opposing machine/digital with that of animal/analog and suggest current theory as privileging the former (505). This preference, they argued, emerges decisively as a "reflexive antibiologism" that is representative not only "bad engineering and bad biology", but also "leads to bad theory" (505). They refer to Anthony Wilden's who troubled the strict distinction of digital/analog by explicating the difference as relational rather than absolute (or referential). I am reminded of the buried complexity in Greimas's 'actantial model' (e.g., Wilden's attributing digital with greater 'semiotic freedom'). In particular, what begins as simple opposition, or an apparent binary structure leads to uncountable, or infinitesimal possible relata of action to model (reversibly one-to-many) - relation of actor to actant as a spectrum of possibilities.

Sedgwick and Frank include Tomkins's graphic representation of his "theory of innate activators of affect" (506). Tomkins theorized that differential triggering of affect came in three variants of the same principle - "the density of neural firing" (506). By this principle, Tomkins intends that relevant to affective states are both the onset rate (gradual versus sudden) and its rate of increase or decrease. So 'interest', for example, Tomkins hypothesizes is triggered by the sudden onset of a stimulus followed by gradual increase. What Sedgwick and Frank introduce as the "cybernetic fold" was both a historical moment and disciplinary fold. As a historical moment, they position cybernetics between modernism and postmodernism, which was also a technological moment when complex computational machines could be "richly imagined" before being possible "in the metal". Epistemologically, this particular fold was the historical and disciplinary contiguity of cybernetics and systems thinking. More specifically, it was a fold of the former with the systems approach to ecology that made possible to discuss "how quantitative differences turn into qualitative ones, how digital and analog leapfrog or interleave with one another" and the jump from tractable to intractable problems (510).

Sedgwick and Frank cautioned against "the installation of an automatic antibiologism" that will sever the conceptual access of 'theory' to the analogic realm of "*finitely many*." Losing this access, they warned, risks foreclosing "a political vision of difference that might resist both binary homogenizing and infinitizing trivialization" (512). In a footnote, they point to "the voided space in contemporary thought between two and infinity". In chapter two, I rehearse a similar debate between critical security theorists that opposes emancipation through universal sameness versus universal difference. The arguments that I focus on share a similar preference for a voided or contested universality.

In the conclusion to the thesis, I introduce a family of biologically based "little security nothings." One of my cases deeply resonates with Tomkins's theory of affect as a mix of analog and digital computation - as a void present by continuously processing the interaction of and gap between affect and cognition [cogfection] as well as, between the drive system. It also resonates with Sedgwick and Frank's interest in nuanced theory able to come to terms with a continuum of difference. As I show, however, the affective/effective theory characterized in my conclusion instead aims for essentialism in both discreteness and instrumentation - as a combinatorial continuum of a certain periodic table subspace.

Karen Barad acknowledges a debt to the work of Haraway, Hayles and Sedgwick, and in many ways she synthesizes their work. Barad's diffractive project is very much what I attempt to do in this thesis. Barad is a colleague of Donna Haraway at U.C. California, Santa Cruz in the History of Consciousness Department (Barad is also a professor of Feminist Studies and Philosophy). She also shares with Haraway an academic background in science (Barad has a doctorate in theoretical particle physics).

Obviously, in going diffractive, Barad is following Haraway's lead, and she explicitly grounds her diffractive methodology in Haraway's. Yet she resituates Haraway's biological perspective within a quantum one. Acknowledging the deep theoretical debt to Haraway, Barad distinguishes her use of diffraction as following a different trajectory than the semiotic one of Haraway. Instead, in Barad's work, diffraction is taken equally as a physical phenomenon and a methodology, and this way enables her to reformulate discursive analysis in a fundamentally quantum manner: "Attending to quantum aspects of diffraction phenomena I also examine in detail the notion of entanglement and propose a rethinking of space, time,

and matter that, among other things, shows the need to take account of topological as well as geometrical reconfigurings in genealogical analysis" (416).

Barad's book, *Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics and the Entanglement of Matter and Meaning* (2007) is to date her most sustained and ambitious project. It is better seen as a synthesis of research she began in the 1980's when she first proposed a reinterpretation, and therein extension of Niels Bohr's philosophy of quantum mechanics. This endeavor remains the foundation for her ongoing project to practice scientific inquiry alongside more socially oriented inquiries - primary among these for her are continental philosophy, feminist and cultural science studies, and feminist theory. In pursuing her reworking of Bohr's ideas, Barad encountered the work of Michel Foucault and Judith Butler, and conjectured a potentially productive experiment to read their theoretical work through physics theories, and vice versa. To briefly survey Barad's work from the perspective of my thesis, I'll rely on an earlier essay, "Getting Real: Technoscientific Practices and the Marterialization of Reality", published in the feminist journal, *Differences* (1998). In this essay, she brings her Bohr-inspired theory of "agential realism" to characterize "technologies of embodiment" as specific arrangements of the material and the discursive that produce some observable phenomena by simultaneously excluding the intelligibility of other possibilities.

One of Barad's primary insights in reading Bohr concerns his argument that "theoretical concepts are defined by the circumstances required for their measurement." In Bohr's thought, 'position' and 'momentum' are theoretical concepts that only become meaningful when the physical circumstances required for measurement are specified. As theoretical concepts, 'position' and 'momentum' are also complementary. Barad elegantly summarizes Bohr's demonstration of this: 'position' can only be determinate by using an apparatus with a fixed platform; while 'momentum' conversely requires an apparatus with a movable platform. These complementary constraints/possibilities are, in Barad's terms, different cuts binding an object to "agencies of observation." Barad explains how Bohr similarly resolved the 'wave-particle duality' paradox: 'wave' and 'particle' are "classical descriptive concepts that refer to mutually exclusive *phenomena*, and not to independent physical objects" (97).

In my second chapter, we encounter resonances with Barad's arguments: I discuss how, with their Transborder Tool, the EDT/b.a.n.g. Lab could be characterized as making alter-

native "agencies of observation" to a single off-the-shelf locative media platform. And in chapter 3, we follow Trevor Paglen in a work that also bears a resemblance to Bohr-via-Barad. In his proposed methodology of "experimental geography," Paglen also takes materiality as an objective ("but not necessarily positivistic") circumstance, but also different discourse possibilities of the particular physical circumstances through which an image is realized. He also assumes the complementarity of fixed versus movable techniques for rendering a single object, as well as, exploring one-to-many circumstances in sometimes excessive discourse things, other times deficient discursive circumstances.

Chapter Overview:

Chapter 1

The first chapter explicates the disciplinary context of this study from four different perspectives. I begin by tracing the geo-historical origins of the positioning of security as a subject of professional inquiry in the United States. Due to a historical and institutional coincidence, I shift between that story and the story of how cybernetics emerged a field of study. Both security studies and cybernetics share the Second World War as an essential driver enabling both to congeal into independent subjects of inquiry. As the Cold War sedimented, the histories of these two fields quickly diverged - security studies narrowly focusing on defining the nation state and strategic use of military force, while cybernetics dispersed to become several different fields of study. The remainder of the chapter surveys three axes of debate that security studies has evolved along: (i) the core internal disciplinary debate between realist, liberalist and (conventional) constructivist paradigms; (ii) the tension between academic approaches to security policies and doctrinal debates to how security is best deployed as a tool of statecraft; and (iii) the peripheral debate in the critical subfield between three canonical schools, geographically indexed by, the Aberystwyth, Copenhagen and Paris schools. I close the chapter by briefly discussing an assessment of critical security studies in which the authors identify politics and ethics as two challenges preventing the subfield from evolving into a viable IR project. Needed, they argued, are more nuanced and empirically focusable analytic frameworks able to come to terms with the questions: "How

do different conceptions of security function politically?", and "What might constitute 'the good' with respect to security practice?".

Chapter 2

The second chapter foregrounds the imperatives of politics and ethics introduced at the end of the previous chapter as a basis to examine a pair of recent, and I suggest complementary, calls made by a network of critical security scholars. Introduced under the rubric of an "analytics of resistance," the first call is to make politics a more operational basis for defining research projects - meaning seeking empirical affordances that enable politics to emerge as a field of action -, and in so doing, privilege the idea of tactics as creative adaptations as opposed to fixed political strategies. The second call is to develop "critical security methods" that emphasize method as performative, as experimental and as reflexive. While not explicit, my performance studies perspective animates both of these projects by emphasizing a fundamentally creative, interdisciplinary, hope-driven and even insurrectional approach to exploring alternatives to security politics. After summarizing each of these calls, I then challenge them as failing in terms of some of the central aims defining both projects. As such, I attempt 'immanent critique' by looking at some of the internal tensions within these projects in order to suggest a somewhat different direction to push these projects. More specifically, I argue that Michel Foucault's notion of 'analytics' is a latent foundation for the interstice linking the two goals. I then introduce a body of work that variously attempts to extend Foucault's project into a more deployable resistance under the register of 'counter-conduct'.

To propel this task, I leverage three resources in particular: Jon McKenzie's exploration of how performance animates the demands underlying cultural, organizational, and technological domains in his book, *Perform Or Else: From Discipline to Performance* (2001). More specifically, I highlight how he attempted to link these domains under the notion of "machinic performance." I use McKenzie's work as a theoretical framework for discussing the EDT/b.a.n.g. (bits, atoms, neurons, genes) lab's Transborder Immigrant Tool (TBI) - a mobile phone application assisting travelers crossing the US-Mexico border by guiding them to water caches. The Lab's consciously anchoring itself as "concurrently affective and effective" provides me an attractive frame for thinking the chapter through both McKenzie's ideas and

the TBI tool. In addition to these resources, I also introduce two CUNY-based engineering projects, both being directed by computer science professor Zhigang Zhu. Fundamental to both projects is adaptive multimodal sensing in general, and the integration of Laser Doppler vibrometer (LDV) as a novel sensing modality that uses vibrational energy. In the earlier of the two projects, LDV is exploited to engineer an adaptive and clandestine surveillance capability. In the conclusion of the chapter, I introduce Zhu's more recently initiated research investigating devices for "alternative perception." In this latter setting, LDV is instead used as a basis for developing wearable "multimodal sensing, display and learning" capabilities enabling, for instance, visually impaired users to "see" with their hands, bodies or faces. Zhu's projects offer a productive variation on the EDT/b.a.n.g. lab's concurrency of effect and affect. Two additional resources that ground the chapter are Alvin Lucier's "I am sitting in a room," and Oliver Heaviside's pioneering work in electrodynamics. First conceived in 1969 as a performance for voice on tape, Lucier's work is also an effective and affective setting for grounding much of the chapter's material. Heaviside offers a possible productive, possible contentious device for rethinking how Foucault approached empirical inquiries. In this respect, Heaviside's invention of operational calculus does indeed itself answer all three of McKenzie's calls in optimizing functionality and productivity by - seizing "symbolic elements from their normative systems, critique and rearrange them, and then reinsert them back into" their original milieu.

Chapter 3

The third chapter examines the American artist and scholar Trevor Paglen's "The Other Night Sky" (ONS) project. Paglen has summarized ONS as "a project to track and photograph classified American satellites, space debris, and other obscure objects in Earth orbit." This project is part of his larger endeavor to both academically and aesthetically provide a geographic account of state secrecy in order to reveal an increasingly institutionalized and yet fundamentally paradoxical security measure used in the United States. For Paglen, as a spatial practice, state secrecy can only be characterized as a production of contradictory space that, by producing more and more spaces of secrecy to operate in, requires concealing more and more secret operations. The chapter is grounded in four methodological principles

that Paglen consistently deploys in both his scholarly and artistic practice: experimental geography, the politics of production, relations of discourse and an updated version of Adorno's negative dialectics.

I first discuss how Paglen has academically intervened in state secrecy discussions. That began in his doctoral thesis, *Blank Spaces on the Map*, completed in 2009. For a more detailed survey of his academic work on state secrecy, I refer to a subsequent essay, "Goat Sucker," in which he contextualizes his geographical theory in the case of the stealth fighter program. In that essay, Paglen's objective was to synthesize some of the disparate ways state secrecy has been analyzed by characterizing it as a spatial practice that transverses physical, social, juridical and biological spheres. These academic works introduce two geographic axioms that Paglen also applies in a somewhat different way in his aesthetic practice: materiality and the production of space. The axiom of materiality is an insistence that stuff matters in an essential way - any spatial practice requires material supports. This axiom also enables Paglen to work empirically but not necessarily in a positivistic mode. The second axiom, the production of space, brings relational dynamics to bear on the first axiom. In his work on state secrecy, Paglen has consistently applied these axioms as an unresolved dialectic pair of material implements and the attempt to conceal them.

Fundamental to Paglen's broader geographic practice is his proposed variation on his discipline's approach to fieldwork in "experimental geography". In discussing what "experimental geography" signals in Paglen's practice, I also demonstrate how it resolves some of the shortcomings that the formulation of "critical security methods" suffers. Paglen's experimental geography positions the axioms of materiality and the production of space as a generative core by recursively applying them dialectically. Methodologically, experimental geography attends to the spatial conditions that make possible some regime of veridiction. For Barad, for example, spatial diffraction is a fundamental condition that makes her work possible. Similarly diffractive, Felman's reading of Austin is made possibleby *Don Juan* and psychoanalysis. Paglen's motivation for proposing experimental geography parallels Lucier's goals in "Sitting in a Room": beyond an interpretive method, experimental geography enables a creative method for conceiving and hopefully producing different spatial possibilities. Like Lucier's work, Palgen emphasizes the experimental nature of his proposal as privileging

"production without guarantees" insofar as the production of space is a creative endeavor that does not signal a deterministic practice.

Chapter 4

The fourth chapter discusses Jill Magid's "Article 12/The Spy Series" that came out of the artist's three year long (2005-2008) commission to produce original artwork for the new lobby of Netherland's domestic intelligence service, the AIVD, or what the artist would come to name "The Organization". Having significantly expanded its operations after 9/11, the AIVD was moving into new headquarters and Dutch law stipulates that a modest percentage of a federally funded budget must be allocated for an art commission. The Organization saw an opportunity to improve its public image, and was looking for an artist to provide the agency with a positive portrait reflecting the agency's mission. Upon accepting the commission, that would become Magid's official directive: to positively render "the AIVD with a human face." Besides the work installed in the AIVD's new building, the commission would culminate in two major public exhibitions - "Article 12" at Stoom Gallery in The Hague (2008), and "Authority to Remove" at the Tate London (2009-2010). The title of the Tate exhibition is perhaps the most succinct explanation of Magid's result: "Authority to Remove" names the Tate's formal procedure for ascribing the authority to receive a work that the museum has accepted temporarily as a loan. Magid is identifying the AIVD as recipient of the works exhibited and include both her redacted report to the AIVD on the subject of its face, and her novel, *Becoming Tarden*, that she was based on her experience of the commission, but written outside of its scope.

Magid chose to use "Article 12" as a basis for creating work - a clause in the Act that created the AIVD that precludes the processing of personal data "on the basis of a person's religion or convictions about life, or on the basis of his race, health and sexual life." This meant she would need to become the agency's first 'Head of Services of Personal Data,' bestowing herself the task of gathering personal data from agents, and for this to be possible, she would need to be vetted for gaining security clearance. Magid gathered data into a "collective file" during third party arranged meetings with field agents. She would submit

her completed file to be redacted in order to remove any information that could reveal the identities of the agents.

To see "Article 12/The Spy Series" as a continuous evolution of Magid's artistic practice, I survey a set of previous works that characterizes a progressive arc leading to what emerged from her collaboration with the AIVD. Magid?s work more generally is best characterized by her fascination with institutional structures that are reclusive, bureaucratic, protective and authoritarian. Besides the AIVD, she has also collaborated with Liverpool's citywide surveillance program and the NYPD. Some of the critical aspects of Magid's practice that I discuss are (i) her early revelation that led her to shift from confrontational arrangements to complicit encounters that involve both the willful participation of and authoritative position of others; (ii) her insight that infiltrating a system that excludes her does not happen by changing the system's infrastructure, but locating a point of entry through one of its intrinsic loopholes; and that these latter often include formal procedures (such as access forms), material processes (such as storage capacities of CCTV databases, and abstract concepts (such as consent, trust, secrecy and authority). I unpack each of these in Magid's work, as well as, reflect on how they supplement the previous chapters.

Magid's most prevalent device is her use of seduction as a method. In most of the sites she works in, Magid has consistently and persistently deployed seduction as a method for locating intimate subjectivities within systems from which they are excluded. I examine Magid's use of seduction, characterizing her application of it within a narrative scheme, but I also cut a little wider, leveraging a constellation of theoretical constructs, including C.S. Peirce's "sign of illation," Jean Baudrillard's theory of seduction, and Ludwig Wittgenstein's "criss-cross" method.

Conclusion

In the conclusion, I return to (almost) the "little security nothings" that Huysmans raised as an impasse for the political study of contemporary security practices that are increasingly mediated, associative and diffused through the everyday. Huysmans argued for the need to "reengage the notion of 'the act' that today increasingly faces the impasse in our contemporary of 'little security nothings' effacing it" (Huysmans 2011). I briefly recall what he is gesturing

toward, and why it can be heard to uniquely challenge performance studies. I also flesh out the work of theorists that have characterized the notion of an act of securitization as enabling its political critique. I explore possible ways this work informs, or is informed by, the projects of Magid and Paglen.

I end by addressing a constellation of sites that hyperbolically situate the impasse Huysmans raised with "little security nothings." I first discuss research proposing to embed authentication data into the implicit memory of a user which can then be verified without the user's awareness by running statistically based behavioral tasks that trigger an alarm if the average difference between a user's stored pattern and the user's instantaneous behavior vary too greatly. I explain how this same basic idea was extended in DARPA's (Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency) program, "Active Authentication", where the verification protocol was sought to run seamlessly across different platforms, applications and human modalities. This leads me to point out a dual research agenda by the same agency to investigate automated discovery of malicious insiders that proves to shift from forensic to anticipatory detection, in advance, of a malevolent act having been carried out. The terminus of this troika of sites is a project that DARPA has conjectured in a hypothetical solution to security problems related to radicalization. In its full scope, DARPA's conjecture moves more towards the opposite end of the spectrum of "little security nothings," but that particular hypothetical rereads Huysmans's little impasse in a manner at once inconceivable and banal. Without arguing for a specific direction, I return to some elements of the thesis that factor in, lend insight to, and are themselves shifted in the context of these "little security nothings."