Truncating seduction along incidence: Jill Magid’s “Evidence Locker”

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Abstract Elsewhere I address a complex sum of a geology and bios of media. Here I argue why Jill Magid’s singular method of seduction finds new purpose for setting loose both in emerging concepts of geomedia and the often dismissed remarks on mathematical foundations found in Wittgenstein’s mature writings. To set Magid loose in both contexts, I draw on two of the artist’s projects, “Evidence Locker” and “Article 12,” to reveal seduction to resonate with Wittgenstein’s crisscross method by similarly appropriating the internal structure of how distinct institutionalizations problems come to be perceptible as such. In one seemingly deformed analogy, Wittgenstein remarked, “[h]ow strange it would be if a geographical expedition didn’t know for sure whether it had a goal, and so also whether it even had a route” (The Big Typescript, 422c). At first perceiving only fallow territory in the analogy, he suggests dropping the comparison altogether, but remained seduced, “It would be like an expedition that wasn’t sure of space! Can we say that arithmetical or geometric problems always seem, or can be falsely conceived, to refer to objects in space, whereas they refer to space itself?" Playing on Wittgenstein’s double ‘geo’ enables me to draw a resonance between he and Magid, as well as, Baudrillard’s theorization of seduction and a series of related logical devices. To lend these resonances to the critical potential of the special issue, I draw on a series of complex projections with ‘incidence’ as a locus.

Introduction

Beginning with her master’s thesis (Monitoring Desire, 2000), the American artist Jill Magid has consistently, and to surprising effect, deployed seduction as a method for locating intimate subjectivities within “impersonal structures” usually characterized as authoritarian, reclusive and bureaucratic. Her pursuits have included the NYPD, the Liverpool citywide CCTV surveillance network, and the AIVD (Netherland’s secret intelligence agency.

Her 2004 “Evidence Locker” provides an exemplary study for spanning all three of the identified Geomedia sub-themes of interest to the editors. Liverpool’s Citywatch program falls under the purview of the Merseyside Police and Liverpool City Council, as a joint effort to
implement England’s largest citywide video surveillance system. Magid acknowledges the exclusionary politics of such systems in targeting and removing those deemed outside politics. She has further characterized such systems as tactical mechanisms subordinated to serve a strategic aim to watch “an area rather than an individual,” and therein privileging a fixed notion of context over the pedestrians passing through it. In this Magid understands programs like Citywatch to be claiming: “The city is permanent, the civilian ephemeral.” For “Evidence Locker” however, she began from a different conjecture. She recognized potential concerning the sheer extensiveness of the Citywatch system comprised of 242 different views of Liverpool, and thus sought to elicit “the city into a movie set with 242 cameramen.” Citywatch is more than an array of cameras - it is also a logistical transmission, storage and report system administered by implicit arrays of procedural rules, as well as, located within a wider set of civic codes.

While several others have addressed Magid’s “Evidence Locker,” my agenda is to seek a different angle on the work by using Geomedia as a provocation. Magid’s method of seduction often recalls Wittgenstein’s criss-cross method (Philosophical Investigation) of appropriating the internal structure of philosophical problems, and his remarks concerning the gap between a rule and its application. In one seemingly deformed analogy, Wittgenstein remarked, “[h]ow strange it would be if a geographical expedition didn’t know for sure whether it had a goal, and so also whether it even had a route” (The Big Typescript, 422c). At first perceiving only fallow territory in the analogy, he suggests dropping the comparison altogether, but remained seduced, “It would be like an expedition that wasn’t sure of space! Can we say that arithmetical or geometric problems always seem, or can be falsely conceived, to refer to objects in space, whereas they refer to space itself?."

Playing on Wittgenstein’s double ‘geo’ enables me to draw a resonance between he and Magid, as well as, with how Foucault deployed ‘counter-conduct’ as both analytic and operation (Security, Territory, Population). To lend Wittgenstein, Foucault and Magid’s “Evidence Locker” to the critical potential of the special issue, I draw on a series of complex projections with ‘incidence’ as a locus.

This article considers two of Magid projects, Evidence Locker and Article 12, as nourishing contexts for letting loose ge media in the city. Because an expedition to find new land is always better in numbers, I invite Ludwig Wittgenstein, a crisscross philosopher of astute wander to help us lose ourselves.

**Evidence Locker**

Magid’s sustained interest to elicit public surveillance systems into unintended platforms for circuits of exchange can be traced back to her masters thesis, Monitoring Desire (2000). This early work also reveals a key shift from seeking to strain rather than seduce a system’s function to afford alternative ones. In ”Lobby 7” (1999), for example, Magid sought to hijack MIT’s main
lobby’s “informational monitor” by “interrupting its daily broadcast with a transmission” of her own corporeal image. In collaboration with Orit Halpern, the two women sought “subversive insertion” by forcing a broadcast system designed for control into a recognition of “to publicly re-present ourselves back into the space in which we were occupying.” Magid has recounted that despite being terrified by publicly exposing herself, “it was also exhilarating,” realizing that with this technically mediated contexture, “I created a new relationship with my body, as well as to the lobby and the people in it.” In this, she punctuated, “It left me stronger and yet more vulnerable.”

The seeming naivety of Magid’s claim to agency would be ruptured upon the entrance of a more responsive authority. When the police were called to the scene, counter-force is too brittle a transgression. Needed is something more pliant to strain— a higher modulus of elasticity. After observing the officers having difficulty connecting the image on the screen with her body occupying its space, Magid wondered about possibilities of collaboration rather than intervention: “If the authority was complicit with me, how would that affect the meaning of my actions? Could responsibility and vulnerability be shared? Permission is a pact, a covenant. It binds the institution and me together, and thus has the potential for intimacy” (Magid & Edwards). With this Magid shifts from a straining of function to instead seek to seduce, or what I will elaborate as an elicitation, or distillation-then-ramification, of a system’s internal relations.

### Disclaimer

The emails and the locker they open are confidential and intended solely for you, the witness to whom they are addressed.

All digital contents are copies of originals stored within the City Watch System. Hard copies of the letters are available at FACT, under the title: One Cycle of Memory in the City of L.

With "Evidence Locker" (2004), Magid takes forward her interest for intimacies with institutional structures through the latter’s inherent arrangements of complicity and sanctioned invitation. To this effect, she manages to obtain something more heterogenous in material, and yet more succinct regarding this complexity. In wildly different form, "Evidence Locker" spans across, and assembles together, the different contexts that inhere a particular institutional production of space—the Citywatch program under the purview of the Merseyside Police and Liverpool City Council, and whose function is to provide citywide video surveillance—the largest system of its kind in England—for Liverpool. Following from her interest in the potential of surveillance technology to provide alternative forms of experience, as well as, to be a resource to "create stages" as platforms for her "to act, and a potential to save this act as a recorded event” (Lovink & Magid). As a tactical mechanism subordinated to serve a strategic aim, surveillance technology deploys to watch "an area rather than an individual,” and by
taking a "static position seems to favor its context over the pedestrians passing through it." In this Magid understands programs like Citywatch to be claiming: "The city is permanent, the civilian ephemeral." However, producing space in this manner, she also perceives a "creative field" for her to play (Lovink & Magid). The move to "play" doesn't mean taking an uncritical position with surveillance programs like Citywatch. Magid has described critical arguments concerning the exclusionary politics of such systems - targeting and removing those deemed outside politics - as running parallel to her concerns. She begins from a different conjecture however - the sheer extensiveness of the Citywatch system comprised of 242 different views of Liverpool "turned the city into a movie set with 242 cameramen."

To carry this conjecture in, confrontation won't do. Magid needs to narrate something more continuous and transactional to elicit Citywatch's potential. Seduction shifts referential bindings from transgression to corporeal "[a]s a sign the camera stands more as a reference to the body or institution that is watching rather than as a tool with the function of securing" ("Seduction"). In turn, Citywatch situates a body encompassing more than an array of cameras - it is also a logistic system (CCTV fiber optic network and individual camera connections, "a very large digital hard drive with a storage capability of 72 terabits") its own procedural rules (footage is stored for 31 days unless it is requested for evidence), but also is open to a larger body of laws (the Data Protection Act states that video images are considered Data and therefore the public has a right to view Data held about them), and therefore requisite internal procedural rules:

Subject to certain exemptions, you have a right to be told whether any personal data is held about you on the closed circuit video camera city scheme. You also have a right to a copy of that information in a permanent form except where the supply of such a copy is not possible or would involve disproportionate effort, or if you agree otherwise. City Watch will only give that information if it is satisfied as to your identity. A fee of £10 is payable for each request. (see Evidence Locker)

Like artists before her, Magid seeks an institutional arrangement as a "creative field," but herein her unique vision is in catalyzing the system's procedural structure as an equivalence class - a system of reference for narrating potentials for intimate subjectivities. Magid's vision does not stop at operationalizing the system itself, but continues in disseminating the seduction. Viewers can access Magid's "Evidence Locker" through a project website only if they offer signed consent to do so. Upon receipt, consenting viewers receive thirty-one e-mails from Magid with a choice between a daily or hourly delivery rate. Each email contains a short letter written by Magid to a surveillance camera operator, the "Observer." At the bottom of the email are files identified as "CD1" - there are thirty-one in total, and a link, "access my Evidence Locker" that takes the user to a "locker" corresponding to a CCTV file, "CD1" for example, with the event of its recording Magid is narrating in the current email to the "Observer." For instance, 21 May 2011, Magid wrote, “Dear Observer, Make me a diary and keep it safe.”:

Take care it is mine. Hold this photograph of my face. Keep all our entries in order. Put
In sum, the thirty-one letters and their corresponding CCTV file give a "cycle" measured by the application of a Citywatch rule: unless a Subject Access Request Form is submitted to report an incident, CCTV footage erased every thirty-one days. The latter of which Magid submitted thirty-one, each given in a corresponding email to a user for reading the letter she wrote to the Observer on the request form about her experience of being recorded that day. One cycle of memory is performed along a recurrence of thirty-one love letters, an intrinsic rule, the Data Protection Act, and thirty-one requests. Subsequently, Magid bundles the letters into a novella, One Cycle of Memory in the city of L (see "Evidence Locker" 2004), that she describes as an "intimate portrait of the relationship between herself, the police, and the city." It is thus that Magid deploys seduction as a narrative schema for her to locate different forms of encountering a particular site.

Videos exhibited from "Evidence Locker" were part of Magid's first solo exhibition, With Full Consent (Gagosian Gallery, New York, 2007). Magid describes the videos "staged and edited by the artist but filmed by the police using the public CCTV cameras." In a few videos Magid wears a bright red trench coat, calls the camera operator that is on duty and requests to be filmed and guided through the city. In one of these, "Trust," Magid shuts her eyes and relies on the "Observer" to conduct her through the city. "Trust" is an amalgamation of Wiener's sensory prosthesis glove, and Zhu's LDV surveillance platform - the intimacy of holding the Observer's hand while they lead you through the city and distance of a clandestine watcher. It is also an amalgamation of Lucier's performance and Zhu's wearable vibrio-tactile field - the sitting Observer and the surrounding field. The video is also suggestive of affect, emotion and the corporeal as methods. The videos and her novella converge discourse/materiality - she repurposed an institutional material, an access request form, into a writing platform that also functioned intrinsically to give her access to the videos. A cycle of memory is at once figuratively about a multiplicity of memories as they relate, and a determinate limit of physical memory (72 terabits) that in turn produces a procedure. I think Magid sets forth a provocative realization of method as practice and method as bricolage. She seduces (sometimes administratively) the Citywatch program, as an institutional structure to perform itself through its methods. In sum, "Evidence Locker" is a combinatorial assemblage - a bricolage of public/private space, institutional logics, corporealities (Magid and her Observers realize different corporealities), materialities and relational loci. As far as the camera network itself, one scholar has argued that Magid's work reveals how inefficient Citywatch performs as a surveillance system. He noted that despite offering "tremendous amounts of data," following "her for 31 days produces
little more than an extended Facebook profile” (Finn, 140). Measuring its work (amount of
data compiled over a significant time) against its result, Citywatch seems to be highly ineffi-
cient in the author’s opinion. A challenge of efficiency indeed. He goes on to load additional
performance pressure on the system’s effectiveness (141):

The ineffectiveness of CCTV in deterring and solving crime is manifest in Magid’s
project in an interesting way: the very thing that CCTV is supposed to be about -
"crime" - is noticeably absent in Evidence Locker. Crime is mentioned in exactly
three incidents. One instance is simply an offhand remark by Magid. Another
features an actual attempt to snatch Magid's purse. The only mention of a (poten-
tially) serious criminal offence turns into a case of mistaken identity, ultimately
pointing to the ineffectiveness of the technology.

He quotes from Magid’s fifteenth day of the cycle in which she is remembering her observer’s
account of a Friday night in which he encountered four simultaneously occurring incidents,
and needed to choose one for closer inspection: "You chose the one involving a woman. A guy
had grabbed her, around the neck, and punched her face. Then he had her on the ground. You
kept watching as they were coming toward you. You brought the window close [zoomed in].
Then you realized they were not fighting: they were kissing. And he had her in a bear hug.”
Without dismissing the author’s concluding that Magid's letter "highlights" both operational
shortcomings and the fragmented nature of the CCTV "gaze,” I find more interesting my own
(second order) observation of Magid’s observer. What were the other three incidents? Did
the camera operator use a key stroke, lever or knob to zoom in on the couple? What did
the observer miss as he was watching Magid while telling her the story? Not so interesting
questions in themselves, but Magid appears to seduce the methodological space of the other
side of CCTV.

The thirty-one letters written by Magid to her Observer are collected under the title, "One
Cycle of Memory in the City of L,” as a diary that portrays not a singular perspective, but an
experience of the relationship between Magid, the police and the city. One cannot help but
find another sundering of incidence in the two or four memories traversing Magid’s “Evidence
Locker” and net artist Cory Archangel’s "Data Diaries.” I am calling attention to what is
a double disinclination between the Citywatch’s “very large digital hard drive with a storage
capability of 72 terabits” and its protocol for dumping its contents every thirty-one days and
Archangel’s exploit of a previous glitch in Quicktime

The old QuickTime file format had a great error checking bug. If you deleted
the data fork of a movie file and left the header, QuickTime would play through
Random Access Memory and interpret it as a video as defined by the header. So
for this project, I converted the RAM of my computer into a video for every day
of a given month. All aspects of the video (color, size, frame rate, and sound)
were determined by modem speeds of the day, as the videos were debuted and
distributed via the web. Aka, they were just small enough to stream in real time (no
small feat!) over a 56k modem in 2003 giving users a pretty good viewing experience (see, Archangel).

Archangel’s deceptively useless irreverence in fact inhabits a more furtive exploit: besides a software glitch and a temporary (until bug fix), Data Diaries screens what Wittgenstein cautioned against reifying as an unbridgeable gap between a rule and its application. Dihedral to this gap is an equivalence beside a process-agreement equivalence principle: the stored-program architecture, the representational equivalence of data and program, sharing memory (read-write) until, in Certeau’s words, “making do.” Watch the videos - imagine, if I hadn’t just told you, trying to infer what algorithm produced them.

**Seduction**

Like net artist Cory Archangel’s “Data Diaries,” Magid operates what Wittgenstein might’ve signaled as an interstitial between a rule and its application. In an artist statement, Magid signaled something ‘kind’ insurrectional: “I do not think the work I make changes the system at its infrastructure, but at the level of its appearances,” along its latencies, or within “an overlap of my needs and its promises.” Here Magid seems to propose a sort of re-pivot of McKenzie’s pivot-concept of a site’s "liminal-norm" (2002). We might also see Magid as offering a reworking of Peter Weibel’s motivation and explanation of context art: ”no longer purely about critiquing the art system, but about critiquing reality and analyzing and creating social processes.

In addition to the above settings, two previous aesthetic paradigms that on the surface seem well formed for analyzing Magid’s work are “context art” and "relational aesthetics." Both of these paradigms define institutional structures to the subject and site of aesthetic work, and also share Magid’s blurring of the boundary between aesthetic and everyday practices. Peter Weibel’s motivation and explanation of context art:

It is no longer purely about critiquing the art system, but about critiquing reality and analyzing and creating social processes. In the ’90s, non-art contexts are being increasingly drawn into the art discourse. Artists are becoming autonomous agents of social processes, partisans of the real. The interaction between artists and social situations, between art and non-art contexts has led to a new art form, where both are folded together: Context art. The aim of this social construction of art is to take part in the social construction of reality. (Weibel, 57)

Indeed Magid prioritizes the creation of "social processes" in her work, and more often these emerge within contexts that are decisively beyond the pale of expected aesthetic practice. However, characterizing Magid’s art in terms of “autonomous agents of social processes” belies Magid’s interest to relate rather than become autonomous. In this vein, she stated an:

interested in exploring systems of power in order to understand how others and I feel about them (and thus add to or take away from their power), how they ma-
nipulate, that they are closed, and where their loopholes lie. Safety and security are not concrete realities, but ideas and perceptions. I am interested in perception and the language that constructs it. (Magid & Greenwood)

Magid, of course, deploys seduction to contextualize, or modalize, connections perceptible in a site's internal processes, and expressible in the different subjectivities brought together. This seems to suggest labeling Magid's art as "relational" in the sense that Bourriaud proposed with the notion of artwork as social interstice: "possibility of a relational art (an art taking as its theoretical horizon the realm of human interactions and its social context, rather than the assertion of an independent and private symbolic space), points to a radical upheaval of the aesthetic, cultural and political goals introduced by modern art" (Bourriaud, 14). Bourriaud's statement is indeed applicable to Magid. Equally fitting is to characterize Magid as operating at an infinitesimal of what the same theorist intended with "social infra-thinness" (l'inframince social) as:

that minute space of daily gestures determined by the superstructure made up of "big" exchanges, and defined by it ... and this "arena of exchange," must be judged on the basis of aesthetic criteria, in other words, by analyzing the coherence of its form, and then the symbolic value of the "world" it suggests to us, and of the image of human relations reflected by it. Within this social interstice, the artist must assume the symbolic models he shows. (Bourriaud, 17-18)

Indeed, most of Magid's projects arise within a particular public "arena of exchange" of interest to her, and then develop through the particular "symbolic model" she assumes to enter that arena - e.g., as "a security ornamentation professional" ("System Azure"), or "as a commissioned artist" ("Article 12/The Spy Series"). These projects also conclude by exhibiting a coherent aesthetic vision of her relational experiences within a particular social interstice. Magid's "Evidence Locker" is an especially strong case for characterizing her work in Bourriaud's terms. The love letters portray an intimacy between Magid and her observer, but also play an institutional function for how a public subject relates to a civic security service. The letters are indeed within a social and symbolic interstice: a romantic exchange that is not only more or less symbolic, but social as an access form between a city surveillance service and a data subject. Broadening the arena brings in logistic (code, or a rule: 'after thirty-one days, write over stored footage') and legislative arenas (code, or a law: the Data Protection Act).

However, while decisively contextually situated and relationally based, Magid does not quite fit with Bourriaud's aesthetic program either. Recall her proposition we began from: "I seek intimate relationships with impersonal structures, and prepare for our seduction." Though bounded on either side by what could only be proven by enunciating in situ some empirical condition between two epistemic frames (intimacy and seduction (mapping to terms, not these categories)), Magid's proposition at the same time is tautological - the conclusion somehow following necessarily from the antecedent act seeking it. In her usage, is it a genuine proposition in the sense of expressing a statement true or false? Or a form of intension signifying a totality
of its extension? Below I appeal to Wittgenstein to suggest how to make sense of Magid’s use of seduction organizing an empiric (an analytic).

Magid stated an attraction for "situations from which she is excluded, whether they are spaces, [or] systems of ideas" (Liverpool Biennial 2004 exhibition statement for "Evidence Locker"). Reading in a strictly intensional logic, her output is the result of a determinately impossible condition. Reading in a looser mode, even the latter, "system of ideas," is categorically difficult to imagine its extension in either proof or negation. Of course, the proposition, "she is attracted to a system of ideas from which she is excluded," might be analyzable in terms of an intensional context - in which extension is not enough. Put succinctly, in some purely intensional context, "spaces" and "systems of ideas" may designate the same object, but they do not have the same meaning. I intentionally left an ambiguity - a space and a system of ideas as co-occurring in one object versus two spaces in a self-identical thing, and two ideas designating one thing. Magid’s statement is a map across mapping functions (e.g., from incident form to a lived incident (an incidence of her location and her Observer’s perceptual coordinates)), "that I seek intimacy with impersonal structures and wait for our seduction.” The Tate statement goes on, "she looks for a point of entry and invents a means and a methodology for access, participation, or exchange."

**Seduction again**

Something is purchasable if we read 'seduction' as lemma instead of proposition. From the Greek lemma, "anything which is received, such as a gift, profit, or a bribe,” to its logical expression of simultaneously a contention for premises below it and a premise for a contention above it, or even "a proven proposition which is used as a stepping stone to a larger result rather than as a statement of interest by itself.” Is the transition from a seemingly irreconcilable interest ("intimacy with impersonal structures") to the inescapability of its extension (in seduction) is perhaps more aptly what Wittgenstein would circumscribe as a deceptively extensional proposition - an intension that "neither can 'give' what the other gives" as 'a dualism' of 'the law and the infinite series obeying it’” (Philosophical Remarks, §180). It is in this setting that Baudrillard's characterization of seduction is simultaneously obvious and surprisingly resolute. The latter theorized seduction as a realm of artifice rather than truth, of "sudden reversibility, absorbed into its own signs without a trace of meaning” (Baudrillard Seduction). Like Magid’s (also seductive) proposition that moves with apodicticity from antecedent to consequent, Baudrillard’s seduction trades depth for (infinitely) obvious and (infinitesimally) reversible tautologies (to):

Immediately obvious - seduction need not be demonstrated, nor justified - it is there all at once, in the reversal of all the alleged depth of the real, of all psychology, anatomy, truth, or power. It knows (this is its secret) that there is no anatomy, nor psychology, that all signs are reversible. Nothing belongs to it, except appearances
all powers elude it, but it "reversibilizes" all their signs. How can one oppose
seduction? [...]

He continued with a lemma, "why become stuck undermining foundations, when a light ma-
nipulation of appearances will do?" Magid's seduction is more nuanced, less spontaneous than
Baudrillard's preference for pure artifice. Magid's sustained curiosity is fundamental for ac-
cessing an otherwise reclusive infrastructure. But evoking impure artifice, Magid's curiosity is
also double-edged.

Ultimately, Magid implements a seductive narrative whose romantic effects are indeed artifice,
or surface effect, and yet, she is interested in the truth of a site, or at least the truth in which
it structures itself. More aptly, she is seduced by a site's interior and the possible subjectivities
it might situate. Inversely, a site becomes doubly seduced by her unforeseen manipulation of
its own processes, and its obsession with the perfect conduct of those processes. This is why
Wittgenstein's "criss-cross" method - both heuristic and patchwork - is so ripe in the context
of Magid's work. Wittgenstein once narrated the geometric problem of angle section in Magid
like modal seduction: "I can look for him when is not there, but not hang him when he is not
there." To truncate Wittgenstein along Baudrillard's seduction however, a third operator is
needed.

To do so, I refer to Louis Kauffman (Kauffman 2001) who has elaborated C.S. Peirce's "sign of
illation" as a portmanteau sign. Briefly recalling the source of the portmanteau construct as
Humpty Dumpty in Lewis Carroll's Through the Looking-Glass (1871), the former explaining to
Alice, "You see it's like a portmanteau - there are two meanings packed up into one word." In
the preface to The Hunting of the Snark, Carroll himself commented,

Humpty Dumpty's theory, of two meanings packed into one word like a portman-
tea, seems to me the right explanation for all. For instance, take the two words
"fuming" and "furious." Make up your mind that you will say both words, but leave
it unsettled which you will say first - if you have the rarest of gifts, a perfectly
balanced mind, you will say "frumious."

Portmanteau is itself a double perspective: at once a combinatorial rule for deriving a single
morph that encodes two underlying morphemes, and also a sign signifying a single concept. To
use a real world example, 'Smog' both encodes smoke and fog along the 'o' axis, and transcodes
the phenomenon of when atmosphere (fog) combines with pollution (smoke). It is this latter
sense that the encoding morph contextualizes, or provides the environment for, the two sub-
sumed morphemes.

In his essay, "The Mathematics of Charles Sanders Peirce," Kauffman relates Peirce's logical
notation to diagrammatic thought more generally in order to unify several different logical and
diagrammatic contexts that are usually studied in isolation from each other. To this end, he elab-
orates Peirce's "Sign of illation" as a portmanteau for inference that in its full generality leads
to Peirce's thoughts about the 'Sign of itself' that Kauffman says in turn leads to self-reference,
and from there into second-order cybernetics. The basic strategy Kauffman employs throughout the essay is to pass between particularity and generality of different notational approaches emphasizing the links between logical connectives and spatial patterns - e.g., geometry (the space of the page) and topology (the equational dynamics). I won't attempt to give a complete account of this essay, but instead distill the aspects desired for this chapter.

In succinct terms, Peirce’s ‘sign of illation’ combines the properties of addition and negation, and as such, signifies ‘to carry or bring in.’ In an essay left unpublished during his lifetime, Peirce indicated that this symbol "must signify the relation of antecedent to consequent," and that in the form he proposed, "takes the shape of a cross placed between antecedent and consequent with a sort of streamer extending over the former.”

Kauffman emphasizes the sign’s implicative operation, but Peirce intended a more general inferential act "not by translating it into if and then, but by associating it directly with the conception of the relation it signifies" (83). The sign of illation then, in its illative act, is a condensation that Kauffman has suggested elaborating as a portmanteau that situates the possibility for a complex implication - the complexity arises in the way Peirce’s sign interfaces the meanings of 'and' and 'or.' The sign anticipates the refutative structure of Balibar’s portmanteau, 'equaliberty.1' to give the spirit of Kauffman's reading of Peirce's sign and hopefully with some effect regarding the subject of the chapter. In particular, what I consider to be the strength of Magid's seduction is captured in Kauffman’s explication of meaning as practice:

If the meaning of a Sign is its use, then the meaning of the Sign is not one but many, according to its uses, and yet one according to the unity that these uses find in the Sign itself (as a complex of Signs fully embedded in language). A hammer makes a good example, being one tool and yet being capable of both the impulsive insertion of the nail and the levering extraction of the nail. Two meanings pivot over the hammer. The combination of claw and hammerhead makes the tool itself a portmanteau of these two actions. (85)

Here, Kauffman is describing what enables a portmanteau. Alongside, or embedded in the notion of a portmanteau symbol, he also introduces that of a "pivot duality": signifying mult-

1Kauffman: "And yet when you think about the matter of when an implication is true and when it is false and how it interfaces with the meanings of 'and' and 'or' a complexity arises".
tiplicity of interpretation, or more aptly, a transformation "between the different contexts of these interpretations." A portmanteau condenses multiplicity by truncating different interpretations. Pivot duality opens the gap. A portmanteau always has an associated pivot, but a pivot need not be a portmanteau. As a topologist, Kauffman would surely be at home in the above constellation of (topo)logical operations. That it arises naturally from his own example is to analogically capture a primary objective of Kauffman's essay: to follow Peirce (later G Spencer-Brown and Shea Zellweger) in bringing spatial form and formal reasoning into a recurring "pattern of patterns" (118). Above I suggested reading Magid's statement that "she is attracted to system of ideas from which she is excluded" as a map between mapping functions. At a recurring "pattern of patterns" we arrive with Michel Foucault's recurrence of conduct with conduct.

With "Evidence Locker" Magid seems to have truncated Baudrillard's seductive "reversible, indeterminate order" (22) along portmanteau contains a pivot duality signifying a multiplicity of interpretation, or in Wittgenstein's wording, an unbridgeable gulf between (the different contexts of) a rule and its application. The gap is crossed by truncating disjunction along negation to give illation: a public secret (an assumed identity now negated then on verum) and a private life (assumed verum then when a blank space now falsum). Recall that Peirce's sign of illation, or what he also referred to as a "copula of inclusion" is partially a NAND operation: deploying it amounts to the negation of the conjunction. In The Mathematics of Charles Sanders Peirce, Kauffman tells us that:

It is the Gödelian sentence that asserts its own unprovability. This sentence carries a double meaning. Inside the formal system, it is a statement about properties of certain integers. Within the formal system there is no hint that the Gödelian sentence has any other meaning. From outside the formal system, the sentence is seen to assert its own unprovability. These two meanings interlock in the compound Sign that is the Gödelian sentence, to form a portmanteau that has forever changed our understanding of the nature of formal systems. This understanding is already present in Peirce through his view of the nature of the perceiving consciousness as a Sign for itself. (109)

Thus we follow the implicative, NAND, from implicature to NOR and realize Peirce's arrow, the ampheck that expresses 'cutting both ways,' neither-nor, 'amphi,' Janus-faced, or 'on both sides' but neither, felicitous if and only if both operands (faces) are false. In a broader view of Peirce's work, the sign of illation was an element of his broader endeavor developing graphic logical notional systems (existential graphs). These systems were fundamental to Peirce's interest to formulate notational devices translating logic into diagrammatic forms. Peirce designed three graphic systems: alpha, beta and gamma graphs. With alpha graphs, he put forward a novel idea - a propositional language in which the blank space of the page signified a verum, and that an enclosed space (called a 'cut' or 'sep') gives negation, and juxtaposition in turn signifies con-
junction. Having defined 'diagram' as an "icon of relations," a 'graph' as a "superficial diagram" and a 'logical graph' as "representing logical relations iconically"; he explains what is unique to existential graphs in this setting (in Peirce & Eisele, 1976):

An existential graph is a logical graph governed by a system of representation founded upon the idea that the sheet upon which it is written, as well as every portion of that sheet, represents one recognized universe, real or fictive, and that every graph drawn on that sheet, and not cut off from the main body of it by an enclosure, represents some fact existing in that universe, and represents it independently of the representation of another such fact by any other graph written upon another part of the sheet, these graphs, however, forming one composite graph. (On Existential Graphs, Euler’s Diagrams, and Logical Algebra, 4.419)

Peirce thus takes the empty space to be doing some operational labor - denoting truth with the blank space of the page. His earlier constructs of entitative graphs were duals to this with a blank space denoting falsity. These recognizable universes (whether "real or fictive") begin with a "sheet of assertion" on which "an imaginary person, called the graphist" would assert. As alpha graphs are concerned with implication, the sign of illation related to these alpha universes, but they assert differently - 'not (A and not B)' in the former, and '(not a) or b' in the latter:

"There is a man who is loved by one woman and loves a woman known to be another."

"the woman who loves and the woman who is loved (whom is not asserted to be otherwise known) are known not to be the same person".

Peirce developed a system of combination rules for manipulating the graphs according to various patterns of substitution and replacement that assert necessary or contingent truths. In the context of his existential graphs Peirce introduced his own methodological frame that he dubbed an "endoporeutic" method (endon signifying 'within' and poros, as 'passage, or pore') (Stjernfelt 2007). His neologism performs what it signifies. Fundamental to his diagrammatic models (or "universes") was the directed flow interpretation that begins from the outermost "cut" and proceeds inward. A spatial practice indeed, and when we follow Peirce to the "Sign of itself," things get very cartographic, but also theatrical. He begins by stipulating what is needed for 'sign' to represent something else, its "Object," is their difference - the sign must be other than its object. He then insists eventually "we must at least make an exception in the case of a Sign that is part of a Sign." He explicates by analogy:

Thus nothing prevents an actor who acts a character in a historical drama from carrying as a theatrical 'property' the very relic that article is supposed merely to represent, such as the crucifix that Bulwer’s Richelieu holds up with such an effort in his defiance. On a map of an island laid down upon the soil of that island there must, under all ordinary circumstances, be some position, some point, marked or
not, that represents qua place on the map the very same point qua place on the island. (C.S. Peirce, Collected Papers II, 2.230 - 2.231)

He continues from this coincidence to self-reference: "we shall reach, or should, ultimately reach a Sign of itself, containing its own explanation and those of all its significant parts: and according to this explanation each such part has some other part as its Object." He thus passes through the pores 'endoporeutically,' as it were, into Baudrillard's Seduction:

by the bracketing of its objectives, of its truth effects which become absorbed within a surface that swallows meaning. This is what happens at first, when discourse seduces itself; it is the original form by which discourse becomes absorbed within itself and emptied of its truth in order to better fascinate others: the primitive seduction of language. (54)

Kauffman has offered to render Peirce's "Sign of itself." He first renders it as an equation asserting the "reentry of J into its own indicational space" by giving J as a "part of itself." Further however, he suggests that if "we wish to embody" this assertion, then what is needed is to "allow the sign to indicate its reentry" rather than its assertion - i.e., move from a constative to a performative mode. Kauffman offered a diagrammatic embodiment of self-reference in the form of "infinity in finite guise"). In the context of Magid's "Article 12," it is preferable that I move from Peirce's 'copula of inclusion' to a copula of involutions. For this I need to return to Magid's "Evidence Locker" in order to characterize it with a portmanteau: As an incidence, truncating in both comprehension and extension, along 'incident' and 'evidence.' Recall how in order to access the 31 video files corresponding to 31 days she provided content for Citywatch CCTV, Magid needed to equally submit thirty-one 'Subject Access Request Forms' to the Citywatch police department each potentially describing the details of some 'incident' that had occurred. Each such incident also corresponded to a particular circumstance between Magid and her "Observer" that would have been recorded and then (later) stored in an "evidence locker" once each of the forms were received. The portmanteau, 'incidence', of course, English already deictically inhabits, and semantically varies. All of its pivot dualities on either side are relevant, but the more salient seem: 'an act or the fact or manner of falling upon or affecting', 'the angle at which a ray (such as a ray of light) hits a surface', 'the arrival of something (as a projectile or a ray of light) at a surface', and the 'rate of occurrence or influence' (e.g., the incidence of crime). In the context of projective geometry, 'incidence' (and 'dual') are relational loci operating on the primitives - point, line, and plane. Put differently and more generally, an incidence structure consists only in objects (or perspectives, subjectivities, etc.) and their 'join' in a relationship between them. There is no distance in incidence. As a portmanteau however, 'incidence' can be unpacked for its constituent pivots: (α) 'incident' signifies the unit of which there are thirty-one (a multiplicity) in a cycle of, or rate of, incidence - each having a specific location and time in the City of L; and there was (β) 'evidence' signifying a "locker" ("a secure / safe type cabinet stored in the equipment room close to an based IBM machine that plays back the digital storage tapes") and a cycle of memory. Imagine a map of Liverpool
Truncating seduction along incidence

with the location of the Citywatch headquarters fixed at its center. Now imagine thirty-one 'J's' scattered around the map from that center - each representing Magid's location one day of the cycle. Next, draw a line from the center to 'J.' The result is an incidence structure. Recall that 'J' was the subject (variable) in Kauffman’s equation asserting the "reentry of J into its own indicational space," and how 'J,' in order to find a body by indicating rather than asserting its own reentry disappeared - in Peirce’s alpha universe, the empty space is now verum, then falsum.

Kauffman suggests that in making the (co)incidence of a map with its territory, Peirce "is using topology as an amplifier for our thought about self-reference" (Kauffman 2001). Thankfully we don't have to unpack this directly because Kauffman offers a familiar experience to explain with the "You are here" operator. Part of Kauffman's objective is to draw to different topologies that give very different incidence structures (my term not his). He speculates that "[p]resumably Peirce is assuming that his territory is in the topological shape of a disk" because otherwise the result he aims for cannot hold. He proceeds:

Imagine a world in the shape of a donut and a map of that world just the size of the world itself. Rotate the map a small amount in both of the turns available on a donut and every point of the map will move away from itself. In this example of a world in the shape of a donut, there are mappings that do not have fixed points. In a universe in the shape of a disk, let the map be of the same size and shape as the disk itself. If we rotate that map about the center point of the disk by a small angle, then the center point of the map will coincide with the center point of the territory, and this will be the only point with this property. (104)

Both of these are 'J,' Jill or Magid, but:

**J's Dis/inclination of J**

In his *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (1922), Ludwig Wittgenstein sought to generalize the notion of logical operation as a series ordered by an "internal relation." Some have read this philosopher’s internal relation as a ‘giving itself order’ while others read as a ‘getting its order from’. For the present text, both will do. The *Tractatus* seduces a generalized form of operation through repeated ramifications of an operator Wittgenstein nominalized with N. N is simply a game of negating any proposition given along with its open conjunction. In positive terms, N delivers the joint denial of an arbitrary number of propositional arguments true if its operant, given false, is so.

Wittgenstein conceived N by generalizing the 'Sheffer stroke' an operation alternating denial of its operands - valid only in the cases, either or or neither - and originally introduced by Henry Sheffer but buried under the weight of Russell and Whitehead's *Principia Mathematica* in which the authors attribute Jean Nicod as purveyor of that operation who in 1916, summarized
either not-p or not-q. With Nicod's axiom, Sheffer's Stroke and operator N, we are really in the shadow of Peirce's sign of illation.

In later his writings, the problem of trisecting an angle seemed to seduce Wittgenstein's thoughts on discoverability and impossibility. In one passage he wrote:

It makes good sense to say that an object is hidden in such a way that it is impossible to find it; and of course the impossibility here is not a logical one; that is, it makes sense to talk of finding the object and also describe the finding; we are merely denying that it will happen. We could put it like this: If I'm searching for something - I mean, the North Pole, or a house in London - I can completely describe what I am looking for before I've found it (or have found that it isn't there) and either way this description will be logically unobjectionable. Whereas if I am "searching" for something in mathematics, unless I'm doing so within a system, I cannot describe what I am looking for, or can do so only apparently; [...] So it is only an apparent description of what is being "searched for". (2005:421e)

Despite, or seduced by, an ambiguity in the notions of "description" and "object" in the comparison between mathematics and cartography, he brings the deformed analogy forward, thinking "[h]ow strange it would be if a geographical expedition didn't know for sure whether it had a goal, and so also whether it even had a route" (2005:422c). Thus perceiving only fallow territory in the analogy, he suggests dropping the comparison altogether. However, seduced nonetheless, he continues, "It would be like an expedition that wasn't sure of space! Can we say that arithmetical or geometric problems always seem, or can be falsely conceived, to refer to objects in space, whereas they refer to space itself? I call ‘space’ what one can be certain of while searching."

In one of several fragments (Wittgenstein 2005) dedicated to angle trisection, Wittgenstein begins, "In Euclidean plane geometry we can't search for the trisection of an angle" (2005:437e). He argues, somewhat cryptically, that if it were possible to ask the problem of trisecting an angle in Euclidean geometry, the question would amount to one "about absolute possibility, which is always nonsense." He thus wants to distinguish two categories of questions: ones taking the form, 'How does one ...?', the other, 'Is this construction the ...?'. He repeats in slightly different terms, "A question makes sense only in a calculus which gives us a method for its solution." Wittgenstein reminds us that Euclid doesn't tell us to search for solutions to his problems; rather, he gives them to us and then proves that there are solutions" (2005:437e).

Wittgenstein's remark is itself a pivot, or declination:

The sense of a sentence – one would like to say – may, of course, leave this or that open, but the sentence must nevertheless have a definite sense. An indefinite sense – that would really not be a sense at all. – This is like: An indefinite boundary is not really a boundary at all. Here one thinks perhaps: if I say "I have locked the man up fast in the room – there is only one door left open" – then I simply haven't
locked him in at all; his being locked in is a sham. One would be inclined to say here: "You haven't done anything at all." An enclosure with a hole in it is as good as none. – But is that true? (Wittgenstein 1973:45)

What this suggests is thinking of angle trisection as a spatial dilemma that is not passing from logical to ontological territories (from intension to being), nor between believable and discovered land (from epistemic to extension), but rather from approximated to necessary. He, Wittgenstein, and I suppose Magid as well as the camera operator, [would] suggest to the other, a scene with an open extension on both sides - 'I was looking for him in London in order to hang him in Liverpool' (but he is hiding in the locked room now gone).

Article 12 / The Spy Project

In 2008, Jill Magid and I met at her Greenpoint studio to discuss her 2004 project, "Evidence Locker." In one of our meetings, I noticed several neon lamps that had been machined to form handwritten text. I thought this to be surprisingly wall mountable media for Magid. Later I learned that these pieces formed a part of Magid's broader project, "Article 12/The Spy Series" that took a budgetary stipulation as its origin and its commission as the artist's challenge to find a human face what I argue was hidden in a logical impossibility.

Few other artistic projects have resulted in the at once engaging, sundering and decisive mise-en-abyme that is "Article 12." In Magid's words, the story begins, "In 2005 the offices of the AIVD (The General Intelligence and Security Service of the Netherlands) were to be relocated. Under Dutch law, a percentage of the project’s total budget had to be used to commission a new artwork for the building. The organization used this as an opportunity to improve upon their public persona, or in their own words, "to provide the AIVD with a human face" ("Jill Magid: Authority to Remove," Tate London 2009). From 2005 to 2008, Magid met with 18 agents in a variety of "nondescript" public locations. These meetings would become the material for a
series of artworks, some of which are either permanently under lock within in the headquarters of the AIVD headquarters or perhaps merely notional at this point, but nonetheless reveal (even in obscurity) through the "specific characteristics of the participating AIVD agents" a generalized face comprised of particulars.

Below I attempt to narrate "ARTICLE 12/The Spy Series" through Magid's persistence to perceive otherwise purely formal categories of the institutionalized concepts of authority, consent, trust, and secrecy in empirical terms as material resources. I suggest that the directive to "find the human face" of the AIVD merely dissembled a genuine proposition in a trompe-l'oeil effect that was in truth, "falser than false," - a tautological blank hidden in a logical impossibility forming the center of "The Organization" itself. Among the works that comprise "Article 12" is Magid's Report for the AIVD on the subject of its face that she submitted to be redacted.

**Article 12 is a portmanteau like PAN**

Magid's collaboration with the AIVD began conventionally enough with an artist, Magid, receiving a letter in the Spring of 2004 from a senior advisor to the chief government architect of the Netherlands detailing a commission to produce original artwork to be exhibited in the lobby of a government agency's new headquarters. Unique to Dutch funding practices is the inheritance of the former, and liberal, Prime Minister Thorbecke's 1862 statement that "The government is not a judge of science or art." In practice, this is legislated in the Cultural Policy Act that stipulates whenever a government agency receives a significant amount of federal funding, a portion of the budget must go to "Special Purpose Funding" to be spent on an art commission. In addition to stipulating funding for cultural production, the Act also provisions that between government bodies and cultural products is always an advisory body acting as a go-between. In Magid's case, it was an advisor for the Dutch Government Buildings Agency that would play the initial buffer - he notified Magid in particular believing her previous work to have a special resonance to the AIVD's mission. Due to increasing demands of a global war on terror, the Dutch Secret Service (De Algemene Inlichtingen en Veiligheidsdienst, AIVD) had recently doubled its size, and in order to accommodate the growth, the organization was in the process of moving its headquarters into a new building at The Hague. Not missing the opportunity to improve its public image, the AIVD was seeking an artist who could positively render its public persona. To help orient the reader, from here I will borrow Magid's system of reference that identifies the AIVD as "The Organization," its headquarters as "The Building" and less dramatically, the representative of the Buildings Agency as the "agency advisor." With the latter's support, Magid was able to get an interview with a selection committee representing "The Organization."

With the Buildings Agency advisor's support, Magid is asked to meet with The Organization's selection committee at the Government Buildings Agency office in The Hague. A few days later, AIVD offered her the commission. She has until the end of the year "to prepare my
angle and outline exactly what I proposed to do for the organization" (Becoming Tarden, xvii). In the meantime, the Agency sent her the Organization's renovation plans for its new headquarters with the assumption they assist her in proposing an artwork specific to the site. She had other plans: "I had no intention of importing something I'd made in the studio. I wanted to be intimately involved with the Organization, to penetrate it." She studied the building's blueprints hoping to understand its administrative structure, "but no avail." In the prologue to her confiscated novel she describes "a conglomerate of hexagonal clusters, like the cross section of a honeycomb," and assesses that, "If there was a central point within the Building from which power would emanate, it was impossible to locate it from its architecture" (x). In addition to the renovation plans, the parcel included a number of publications by the Organization about its work. These suggested to Magid a list of questions concerning "the Organization's" methodology that she would address to the committee.

Magid continued "digging through everything" she could find on the agency in order to find a loophole, her "point of entry," and realized when coming across "Article 12" of the Bulletin of Acts, Orders and Decrees of the Kingdom of the Netherlands (see The Intelligence and Security Services Act 2002), she found it. The article a clause precluding the agency from unfettered "processing of personal data on the basis of a person's religion or convictions about life, or on the basis of his race, health and sexual life." The Bulletin containing Article 12 is an Act of legislation (the 148th Act of 7 February 2002) that creates both the AIVD, as well as, the MIVD (Military Intelligence and Security Service of the Netherlands) - the former focuses on domestic non-military threats to Dutch national security, whereas the latter focuses on international threats, specifically military and government sponsored threats such as espionage. Article 12 is among several acts identified collectively under the "Intelligence and Security Services Act 2002" that provides the rules relating to the operations of the intelligence and security services. The AIVD is established in the sixth article of the Act with an existential speech-act: "There is a General Intelligence and Security Service" (The Intelligence and Security Services Act 2002). Article 12 appears as the first clause of the third chapter that covers rules regarding the processing of information by the services. In fact, Article 12 cannot be isolated from subsequent clauses, or at a minimum from immediately subsequent clause. Section 3.1, which sets out "General Provisions" beginning with Article 12:

QUOTE OMITTED

Magid's first thought was, "what else is there" besides "a person's religion or convictions about life, or on the basis of his race, health and sexual life?" What she proposed to the AIVD's selection committee was for them to hire her as the agency's first 'Head of Service of Personal Data,' and from this position she would gather personal data from agents defined in the above clause by those "who are currently or have been employed by a service," and by (retroactive) implication, those "who have given permission for a security clearance investigation." She would arrange private meetings between the agents and herself to be conducted at "sites of the agents' choosing," and from these meetings would compile the personal data of individual
agents into a "collective file sketching the face of The Organization." The committee agreed after additional conditions were met: Magid provide aliases to avoid using agents’ real names in the report, members of the AIVD’s public relations team ("whose names and faces were publicly known") would act as go-betweens to arrange meetings with only agents that have volunteered to meet. Also, Magid’s report must "build a positive image of The Organization's role within society." Lastly, she would have to be investigated, or "vetted" in order to receive security clearance - "I encouraged them to do so." In the prologue to her confiscated novel, Magid points out that the security service had preferred to avoid this last step being a costly and time-consuming procedure (in Magid’s case, the procedure took eight weeks) (Becoming Tarden).

Already the clauses above begin to re-enter themselves. The AIVD’s challenging Magid to find the organization’s human face - to discover an attractive identity in a "collective file" of aliases - is met with her challenge to be vetted as a potential person of confidence. Mere coincidences amplify things. It is readily apparent for instance, that the clause in itself positions a loophole in the final paragraph: processing personal data is not precluded as such, but when "inevitable, will only take place supplementary to the processing of other information." Emphasis added to point out the fait accompli ('a fact' + 'accomplished') at work in the clause. I speculate that Magid’s motivation for using Article 12 as a basis for her to work from is how the clause weaves a network through the entire Intelligence and Security Services Act. I have not come across either confirmation or an echoed speculation, so I don't attempt to make this a key import of my discussion. Nonetheless, by Article 17 the AIVD is provided the legal basis to request information from any government office (police registers, citizen records, land registers, etc.), any civil servant, any party responsible for processing of personal data and "furthermore anyone who is supposed to be able to provide the required data" including "Google, health insurers, banks, web shops, the grocery store and your neighbors, insofar necessary for the AIVD's legal tasks." This links Article 17 directly back to perceptible loophole in Article 13: personal data may be processed as long as there is existing data not included in that category already held by the service. Article 17 makes this inevitable by stipulating "anyone who is supposed to be able to provide the required data."

In turn, zooming out to view this corpus to which the Act links offers the subtlety in Magid’s proposed seduction. What is stipulated as having to be only "supplementary" - the personal data of agents - has now become the direct aim of information gathering. Magid specifically proposed that the AIVD make her a "Head of Service" because of their somewhat second-order role in being responsible for managing the secrecy of the service itself. Article 15 for instance makes the Heads responsible for: "the secrecy of the relevant information", "the secrecy of the relevant sources from which information is derived" and "the safety of the persons co-operating in the collection of the information." The subsequent clause in turn states that the heads of the services are also responsible for the necessary provisions "to promote the accuracy and completeness of the information processed," as well as, to protect the "technical and organisational nature" of information "against loss of, or damage to, information, and against
the unauthorised processing of information.” From the position of a Head of Service these duties would concern the personal data of the agents. What am I signaling at here?

**Conduct and Circumstance**

The AIVD’s "Personal Conduct and Circumstances Guide” defines an "agent” as: ”a person who, instructed by and reporting to the AIVD, is assigned to gather specific intelligence concerning persons and organisations. They may do this under an assumed identity or position, but not necessarily. The information in question is either of potential relevance to the AIVD's performance of its own task or could assist the service in taking measures to protect others.” In other words, as the "Head of Service of Personal Data,” Magid is charged with managing the secrecy of the accurate and complete information, as well as, its "technical and organisational nature” on the agents’ personal lives that in turn have somewhere else another Head that is responsible for managing "the secrecy of the relevant information” concerning an agent's frequently "assumed identity or position.” Reflecting the agent’s (spy’s) public secrets is the employee’s secret personal life. At this point we can reinterpret "Article 12” not to refer to a particular clause in the Intelligence and Security Act, but a more general sign that like Kauffman’s reading of Peirce’s sign of illation, is a portmanteau sign truncating a multiplicity of secrecy pivoting along revelation, and vice versa.

The same document defines an "Official report,” which Magid was compiling as: "A notification, in writing, to a person or institution revealing personal details held by the AIVD which could assist the recipient in discharging their public responsibilities.” The pamphlet also defines a 'Special intelligence resources' as any: "Technical and other instruments which are deployed in the exercise of a special power under the 2002 Intelligence and Security Services Act and which are usually secret in nature.” For a definition of "special power” one must return to the Intelligence and Security Act where Articles 18 through 33 specify the range of what clandestine "technical and other instruments” usually amounts to. Article 22 for instance, provisions that, ”The services are authorised, with or without the aid of a technical instrument: to conduct a search of enclosed spaces; to search closed objects; conduct an investigation of objects aimed at establishing a person’s identity.” The subsequent clause authorizes the head of AIVD to mandate an order "to open letters and other consignments without the consent of the sender or the addressee, provided the District Court at The Hague,” or otherwise "postal institution or transport company.”

The pamphlet defines a 'security screening’ as "An investigation of an individual in search of facts or circumstances which, on grounds of national security, may be relevant to filling a position involving confidentiality.” In particular, vetting is done to evaluate, or challenge, a candidate’s potential vulnerability to the "constant exposure to state secrets.” During a screening, the service "forms an opinion” of a certain person by vetting the "circumstances” of an applicant’s "work” and "private life” to "discern” potential "conduct.” A felicitous security clearance
is a "statement of no objection." The formed opinion however, must suspend moral judgement by assessing only an applicant's "potential vulnerabilities of a specific person in a specific confidential position." Vetting focuses on the person’s "environment" including, "specifically the partner, if there is one" for relevant vulnerabilities by assessing, honesty, independence, loyalty and integrity. Negative indicators include: "subversive and anti-democratic activities" as well as "deceitful or secretive" and "risky behaviour." Once again, matters have given Baudrillard’s seductive "reversible, indeterminate order" (22) where "subversive" and "deceitful or secretive bahaviour" - characteristics likely preferred for a good spy - indicate poor conduct with respect to an applicant's potential vulnerabilities. The "Article 12" portmanteau contains a pivot duality signifying a multiplicity of interpretation, or in Wittgenstein’s wording, an unbridgeable gulf between (the different contexts of) a rule and its application. The gap is crossed by truncating disjunction along negation to give illation: a public secret (an assumed identity now negated then on verum) and a private life (assumed verum then when a blank space now falsum). Recall that Peirce’s sign of illation, or what he also referred to as a "copula of inclusion" is partially a NAND operation: deploying it amounts to the negation of the conjunction.

“**It could have been anything, including nothing**”

With her directive to render a positive portrait of "The Organization's" role within public society, and now having obtained the needed security clearance for acting as 'the Head of Personal Data', Magid enlisted a friend to help her produce a short video hoping to solicit agents to meet with her. [...]. Over the next three years Magid meets with her subjects - 18 agents in all. As stipulated, each of the meetings were arranged via a third party "fixer" with each taking place in distinct and impersonal locations (restaurants, bars, airport meeting points). Using Vincent or Miranda as generic aliases to keep their identities from being revealed, Magid collected personal data from the agents. The result was a collective portrait of "The Organization" given in Magid's report, *Article 12: Report for the AIVD on the subject of its face*. Magid submits her report to "The Organization" on April 17, 2008 acknowledging it as prepared for redaction - removing any information that could compromise her sources' identities. She dedicated the report to "those in the AIVD who keep its secret warm." In its redacted form, Magid's report is strangely satisfying. It reads like something between nouveau roman and a Burroughs cutup novel. The report however is only one pivot in a portmanteau - the other pivot being Magid's confiscated novel, *Becoming Tarden* that she based on the report. They really must be thought together - a securitized portmanteau truncating redaction along confiscation.

She bases the video on the opening scene of Jean-Luc Godard's film *Week End* (1967) in which a woman sitting on a desk describes a sexual encounter involving an egg and an orifice to a man presumptively transcribing her narrative into a typewriter. The woman delivers the story with a dry monologue that effectively emptied the encounter of any eroticism - echoing Baudrillard's characterization of seduction by "reversibilizing" the depth of language, seducing it into banality. The communication department rejects Magid's first video submission as "being too ellipti-
A second, re-edited to one minute is accepted, and then broadcast throughout The Building's information monitors. Several agents were "drawn in," and contacted Magid's assigned go-between. A second, re-edited to one minute is accepted, and then broadcast throughout "The Building's" information monitors. The response was positive - "Agents were drawn in. They called my contact to volunteer and meetings were arranged" (xxv).

April 20, 2008 marked the official end of Magid's commission, and was marked with two simultaneous openings both at distinct institutional locations in The Hague - a public exhibition of "Article 12" hosted by the Buildings Agency in the Stroom Gallery, and a more limited viewing of works to be presented in the lobby of the AIVD's new headquarters. On the day before the openings, "The Organization" dispatched a group of agents to the Stroom location in order to approve the exhibited works. They appeared to do so. Magid also handed them a copy of her manuscript, Becoming Tarden, so that they can similarly assess for any sensitive information that it might contain. As a work of fiction loosely based on Magid's meetings with the agents, she considered her manuscript to be independent of the commission. She also had no intention of unduly risking the agents identities, and therefore sought a consensus on its contents regarding possibly sensitive information. The story that (somewhat) terminates with Magid's response that she registered under "Article 12/The Spy Series" which has a multiplicity of pivots for describing the project - the commission, its experience, as a series of artworks, exhibitions, from its basis in Article 12, etc. Pivoting from the different categories of exhibited artworks is rather empty by itself - e.g., "Mixed media project including drawing, photography, neon, prints, performance, and novella." Alternatively, the commission could be narrated as a series of causally related events (which did somewhat above, and I list in the second appendix for the reader). Anchoring the discussion in Article 12, and by implication, within both the specific institutional context of the commission and the different exhibition sites is the most promising. I started to do this above, but needed to suspend to give some context first. Ultimately, all of these are required insofar as each is fundamental to Magid's practice.

I'll attempt to summarize how the different artworks situate "Article 12/The Spy Series" across the various exhibition sites. The project can be thought to culminate in four exhibitions: The two mentioned in the previous paragraph - in the Stroom Gallery appeared a series of handwritten notebooks documenting Magid's encounters with secret agents. From these, she created artworks using a wide range of media including the neon sculptures of "I Can Burn Your Face" (a phrase used among secret agents as a threat of identity exposure), a series of drawings, "The Directives," letters and photographs. The Stroom exhibition should be understood as the public presentation of Magid's collective portrait of "The Organization". The opening of the AIVD's new building was the private pivot on the public viewing at Stroom. At both places were Magid's Report for the AIVD on the subject of its face pivoting along the previous complementarity - public/private, and reflecting the 'act' posited by Article 12 as a portmanteau truncating employee/spy. One year later, "Authority To Remove" is exhibited at the Tate Modern from September 2009 - January 2010, but to understand the conatus that the show effects/affects, more of the story of Magid's relationship with "The Organization" is needed.
Upon reading the manuscript Magid had given them, the same set of agents return to Stroom and confiscate a number of the exhibited artworks. On May 17, 2008, the "Committee Head" calls Magid to inform her that the redactions are complete - "A quarter of your report has been censored. Does that scare you?" She admits that it does, and then tells him that "in the meantime, I will finish the manuscript." Surprised, he asks, "There is more?" By this time, Magid had returned to the United States. The heavily edited Report was delivered to her Brooklyn studio by a representative from the Dutch Embassy in Washington D.C.. Adopting "The Organization's" own tactics, Magid arranged for a hidden photographer to secretly document the handover of the document. To Magid's surprise, in addition to "potentially sensitive information given to her by her sources," they had also redacted several passages in which she narrates her private thoughts during the meetings with agents.

On June 3, 2008, Magid returns to Amsterdam and is given more bad news from her advisor from the Buildings Agency - "the director of The Organization is suddenly involved with my assignment" (174-175), and he has called an emergency meeting. In the meeting, the director informs Magid that "The Organization will no longer permit [her] exhibition to travel," and she is now directed to "discontinue work on [her] book, and agree not to publish it." He threatens to seize her computer and "wipe its hard disks clean of any material connected with the project." When she refuses to comply, the director threatens that they'll take her to court. Two days later, Magid meets with her advisor, his boss and a lawyer. The latter explains to the director that Magid's commission is with the Buildings Agency, and not The Organization. One hour later, Magid's advisor has returned with the Director to further discuss matters. In support of Magid, the advisor insists to the Director that the artworks produced in the scope of the commission are the ones exhibited at the Stroom and the report she submitted, but does not include the manuscript for Becoming Tarden. The manuscript was done outside the commission, and as such, "beyond his control" (176). An increasingly heated exchange ensues. Eventually, the communications agent suggests to Magid that, "We want you to think of the book as an object of art. We will redact it and put it inside the vitrine with your notebooks where it will remain, permanently." Magid reiterates what is being suggested, asking, "You want me to put it under glass so that it will no function as a book but as a sculpture?" (183). The director, with a noticeable shift in tone, "imploring" her, "Will you consider that, Jill?.

In the epilogue to Becoming Tarden, Magid editorializes on this scene that, "Power is a set of relations" (183).

On July 17 2009 a letter from the AIVD, signed by the director and others, arrives at Magid's Greenpoint studio in Brooklyn. It confirms what had been the suggested solution to "present the manuscript as a visual work of art in a one-time-only exhibition, after which it would become the property of the Dutch government and not be published." Unable to publish the remaining fragments of the text as a coherent novel, and protesting against the AIVD's censorship of her own memories, Magid nonetheless decides to comply, reasoning that The Organization had indeed has shown its face.
Magid’s exhibition, ”Authority to Remove,” opens at the Tate, London on 10 September 2009. In the exhibition appeared Magid’s manuscript, as redacted by the AIVD, her notebooks she kept throughout the commission, as well as, her un-redacted novel, Becoming Tarden, both exhibited sealed in a glass vitrine. ”The Thicker The Glass” appeared at gallery Yvon Lambert, Paris between January 31 and March 7, 2009 where the eighteen letterpress prints that describe the eighteen agents with whom she met and comprising ”The 18 Spies” (seven have been confiscated by the AIVD), six of the neon sculptures in ”I Can Burn Your Face” (three of which have been turned off, due to the AIVD’s confiscation of the prints that define them), the redacted manuscript, and the series ”The Kosinski Quotes,” comprised of nine quotes from the spy novel Cockpit by Polish-born writer Jerzy Kosinski, included as a description of Magid’s personal methodology. An excerpt from the Tate’s exhibition statement reveals the performative mode of the show’s title:

Magid explores what it means to have a secret but not the autonomy to share it. She has taken the title from the official Tate form that would need to be completed and signed, were her book to be confiscated. By adhering to the rules laid out by the Dutch secret service, Magid intends for this exhibition to constitute the end of her performance, the surrendering of her authorship to The Organization.

Pivot, portmanteau. ”Authority to Remove” challenges The Organization to publicly perform what it cannot show. Magid's challenge is isomorphic to The Organization's challenge for Magid to give up the body of her novel, and to deliver that dual deceit, Magid chooses to truncate her book’s exhibition in the Tate along that site’s intrinsic procedure for distributing the deontic modality authorizing an entity to remove a temporarily held artifact. In effect, her book has lost any complementarity in extension and intension to become instead a twisted proposition to act: her completed manuscript redacted and her novel made inaccessible. In the former, Magid characterized the ”secret” as ”much more beautiful than its revelation.” Perhaps similarly, Wittgenstein characterized Platonism as alternatively ”mere truism” or a picture comprised of ”an infinity of shadowy worlds” (LFM 145) making it both without explanatory ”utility” and misleading. In stipulating that Magid's un-redacted novel be exhibited
as if a sculpture sealed under a glass vitrine, the AIVD securitizes its contents by removing its utility - foreclosing it within a picture that explains nothing. Magid's chosen title for the Tate exhibition posits this possibility as an isomorphism from a book to a visual object - the latter an ascription of right for the AIVD to remove it from public view. I imagine it would have been nice to see Magid's books exhibited in the Galileo Museum alongside Galileo's preserved fingers such that they are pointing to the books - neither able to practice the other. With "Authority to Remove," Magid rediscovers Peirce's 1880 discovery of the functional completeness of NAND or NOR using the term *ampheck* (for 'cutting both ways,' Janus-faced).

There are coincidences beyond the one just mentioned, and a different perspective is required to characterize: the title of the Tate show, "Authority To Remove," has to be read in a similar mode as Lucier's "Sitting in a Room." Just as Lucier's title is an autological performative in the way it (the text) gives precisely what it (voice) disappears, Magid's title signals an official and likewise performative disappearance of her redacted manuscript, notebooks and un-redacted novel. Out of the notebooks came the manuscript, out of the manuscript came her novel, and each would remove the other in reverse order. Ultimately, it is this sort of perspective that is needed to grasp "Article 12" in particular, and more generally. Two years after the Tate exhibition, Magid's "Article 12" was included in The Center for Book Arts exhibition, "Canceled: Alternative Manifestations and Productive Failures" (New York, NY, April 18 - June 30, 2012). The exhibition intended to explore "the book form" as an alternative route "by which the politics surrounding the presentation and creation of art become at least as relevant as the work itself." In what ways are Magid's texts like Lucier's voice I wonder?

"Language is not contiguous to anything else" (*Wittgenstein Tractatus*)

Above, I have attempted, with brief sideway glances, to demonstrate how Baudrillard’s (1979) theory of seduction shares more than a mere semantic circumstance with Magid’s work. I indirectly argued that Baudrillard’s overarching thematic of seduction - its turning away from a sexual order to enter into a game of surface effects, simulation and displacement - can be a productive frame for unpacking how Magid herself deploys seduction as a method, or an analytic, for locating seemingly impossible subjectivities. Baudrillard’s compact book gives frequent passage to Magid. He characterized the privileging of "latent discourse" as an interpretive objective that puts a stop to play by seeking to reveal the deeper reality beneath an apparent real. Opposite is seduction’s preference for "manifest discourse," or:

discourse at its most superficial - that turns back on the deeper order (whether conscious or unconscious) in order to invalidate it, substituting the charm and illusion of appearances. These appearances are not in the least frivolous, but occasions for a game and its stakes, and a passion for deviation - the seduction of the signs themselves being more important than the emergence of any truth - which interpretation neglects and destroys in its search for hidden meanings. (53)
Magid likewise turns toward the AIVD's manifest discourse by basing her directive to find the attractive face of "The Organization" on Article 12 - a seemingly banal and obvious clause that is, at least on the surface, delimiting the place where the AIVD's investigation cannot reach. Moreover, Magid's apparent interest in the clause is not so much its hidden meanings as I alluded to above. Rather, the clause's lack of sense (what else besides such data matters?) challenges her, but so does its logistic impasse - does it simultaneously apply to agent/employee, or now agent, then employee? Her solution is to produce herself in a role, or persona that enables her, once vetted, to appear as a partial "Head" of "The Organization." Of course, her role as "Head of Personal Data" is itself merely appearance, or what Baudrillard said of the trompe-l'oeil as "falsers than false," and therein as "blank, empty signs that bespeak" a missing representation (60). Magid's series of neon sculptures include cryptic phrases such as "Loud Squeaky Voice" and "Dark Puffy Bob." These are cursively written descriptions of two agents noted by Magid during their meeting. The sculptures operate like trompe-l'oeils by removing any useful dimension of the agents' representations that might reveal their truth. As Baudrillard said of trompe-l'oeil, they are "[s]craps of social life" that give neither "nature...nor landscapes, skies, vanishing points." In the publically exhibited works she created for the commission, Magid manages to seduce dimension to go beside itself. In addition to "Article 12,? Magid put Jerzy Kosinski's 1975 novel, Cockpit at the center of her confiscated novel. She ends the prologue with a passage from the book describing "hummingbirds" as secret agents considered "so valuable that to protect their covers no central file is kept on them and their identities are seldom divulged to other agents.? It continues by pondering, "I always used to wonder what would happen if a hummingbird vanished, leaving no proof ?" It seems Magid seduces herself to become a little trompe-l'oeil.

Looking for a pivot, Baudrillard gives what could be considered an economic statement of Magid's "stratagem" when he reads Kierkegaard's *Diary of a Seducer*,

A mirror hangs on the opposite wall
she does not reflect on it
but the mirror reflects her

He then suggests that the "seducer's stratagem will be to merge with the mirror on the opposite wall in which the girl is reflected," but that dual to this will the girl that is paying no attention to the mirror even while "the mirror is reflecting on her." Baudrillard repeatedly plays on the double meaning for the French word for 'dual' as also signifying 'duel,' and here it is to emphasize the diagonal rather than simply oppositional tendency of seduction. I am reminded both of Magid's stratagem to enter a "Head" through Article 12, and resistance as a creative, tactics of "making do." Like mirror reflecting on the girl, Magid creates an image challenging "The Organization" to decide how deeply to reflect on her.

While all this seems to suggest Baudrillard's analytic of seduction to be precisely isomorphic to Magid's method, significant divergences are in play. Primary is Magid's sincerity to her site's infrastructure. For instance, in her commission with the AIVD, as well as, her collaboration
with the Citywatch program in "Evidence Locker" seem to decisively invalidate Baudrillard's explicit rejection of contract from being possible in the sphere of seduction when he writes, "[t]here can never be seduction or challenge by contract," and continues stipulating that "for a challenge or seduction to exist, all contractual relations must disappear before the duel relation - a relation composed of secret signs that have been withdrawn from exchange, and derive their intensity from their formal division and immediate reverberation" (82). In her artist statement, "Seduction", Magid wrote, "I consider the contract (real or implied) for another to engage with me as a material of my work," and that she attempts to design this in practice through "the exchange of money as a material of the work, so that 'support' is not blind, but produces a meaning of its own." Baudrillard would likely approve of the idea of turning a contract into something of a trompe-l'oeil by appearing as "a material" for artifice, but for Magid a contract is not "falser than false." In stark contrast to Baudrillard's dismissing any exchange of value in seduction, for Magid, the exchange is not only of importance, but also "produces a meaning of its own." Magid has brought the realm of production, and meaning into the game of seduction. In an interview, her interviewer remarks on his fascination with her idea of "consent as an artistic medium" because of the ambiguity that such a medium affords, Magid responds decisively that for her, and in the context of her work, permission affords no such ambiguity. She explains that a primary dimension of her work is the authorization she needs to access an institution - "consent can be part of the work; other times it is what allows the work to proceed" (Magid & Edwards). The gulf opens wider between Magid and Baudrillard when the latter further stipulates that:

The sovereign power of the seductress stems from her ability to "eclipse" any will or context. She cannot allow other relations to be established - even the most intimate, affectionate, amorous or sexual (particularly not the latter) - without breaking them, or repaying them with a strange fascination. She constantly avoids all relations in which, at some given moment, the question of truth will be posed. She undoes them effortlessly, not by denying or destroying them, but by making them shimmer. Here lies her secret: in the flickering of a presence. She is never where one expects her, and never where one wants her. Seduction supposes, Virilio would say, an "aesthetics of disappearance. (Seduction, 85)

Where Baudrillard rules against any consent by the seductress to yield "sovereign power," Magid instead perceives consent to condition the possibility for the game of seduction. Moreover, she has no interest in eclipsing the "will or context" of the institution, but on the contrary, to locate a certain symmetry. She has expressed an interest in a tenuous symmetry, "one that is never quite resolved," can cut both ways, and provides an operative tension. Baudrillard's and Magid's seduction are not strictly oppositional, but such divergences suggest they are at least skewed - resisting the truncation of a portmanteau. This is perhaps most clearly illustrated in Magid's remark above, "This being said, I do not think the work I make changes the system at its infrastructure, but at the level of its appearances. I use the system, via of its latent qualities, for an intimate and poetic experience, in an overlap of my needs and its promises."
“how can player b win a game in "20 moves" in a "game whose rules we don't yet know precisely?" (Wittgenstein (2005, p. 421))

I again wonder what Galileo's digits might be pointing toward. Wittgenstein is not rejecting that searching for continues this cartographic versus mathematic comparison by situating it in the context of a "polar expedition" and remarks that in the latter there is an ambiguity in the notions of "description" and "object" at work (421e). He imagines someone going to the North Pole expecting to find a flag there with such and such properties. He asks "should such an expectation" - an approximation of what one is searching for - "refer indirectly to the expectation" and not at all to some sought after thing - to "a something not known directly?" Nonsense, he concludes - "I must be able to describe completely what I am looking for."2

Here Wittgenstein is likely himself being indirect by loading pressure on Gödel's incompleteness proof - What (Kauffman 2001) above referred to as "the Gödelian sentence that asserts its own unprovability." Recall that Kauffman distinguished the sentence's meaning from within the formal system from its assertion outside the formal system. Inside the system it is a statement, or description of, some properties of a particular class of integer (a flag having certain features). Viewed from outside the system however, it instead asserts its own unprovability. Wittgenstein (deceased when Kauffman said such) does not accept this. The general consensus, though by no means unanimously so, is that Wittgenstein misunderstood Gödel's proof. I will not take a position on that, nor be seduced into attempting to show how Gödel's theorems are relevant here, but I do think leveraging Kauffman's deceptively simple ideas makes it possible. Wittgenstein nonetheless brings his deformed analogy forward, thinking "[h]ow strange it would be if a geographical expedition didn't know for sure whether it had a goal, and so also whether it even had a route" (422c). Thus perceiving only fallow territory in the analogy, he suggests dropping the comparison altogether. However, seduced nonetheless, he continues, "It would be like an expedition that wasn't sure of space! Can we say that arithmetical or geometric problems always seem, or can be falsely conceived, to refer to objects in space, whereas they refer to space itself? I call 'space' what one can be certain of while searching." Paglen is per axiom one, but Magid, as it turns out, was searching for the face of "The Organization" in the wrong space, or from within an adjacent system. I read the situation as permuting a different geography.

Perhaps not obvious is that Wittgenstein is here, as he does consistently in his later work, approaching the site of inquiry similar to Foucault. He is not attempting to give a mathematical result (on angle trisection or some foundational theory), nor even advance a philosophical one. Rather, he wants to show how a problem was made possible to be perceptible as such. He therefore is using the problem of Euclidean angle trisection as an analytic in the sense that Foucault intended - as an empirical site to make analyzable how (in Wittgenstein's case) a nonsensical problem, or (in Foucault's terms) a knowledge regime was able to congeal for

2Elsewhere, Wittgenstein qualified 'search' by stipulating that "You can only search within a system: And so there is necessarily something you can't search for" (Philosophical Remarks, §150).
knowledge/power to operate on, and through. That the two thinkers might converge beyond a general methodological project is perhaps defensible, but I am not doing that here. The methodological convergence however, I believe is appropriate.

It is possibly worth challenging Wittgenstein’s cartographic reduction with a cartographic historical counter narrative concerning the systematic search for conjectured, or notional territories that turned out not to exist. Take the case of the island of ‘Antilia’ that appears on a work by the mapmaker Zuane Pizzigano’s 1424 portolan chart that he painted on vellum. The name was coined by Pizzigano, and more recently a Portuguese historian, Armando Cortesao, etymologizes the term as anti (‘before’) and ilha (‘island’) thus suggesting a descriptive signifier that there is “an island before a continent,” and ‘Antilia’ is it. Now a portmanteau is possible by reaching across languages to give ‘antisland,’ but that’s not my point. Portolan maps are well known for being densely inclusive compendia of state of the art knowledge, and as such, serve useful historical maps by studying it comparatively. Like so many maps, Pizzigano’s was also the creation and exploit of political and religious strategies. Their interpretation at the time, for instance, supported a Christian counter response to the loss of large territory to an emerging Islam. Like Paglen’s blank spots on the map, Pizzigano’s similarly seduced a synergy of frontier dreaming and military expeditions, but did so inversely by giving body to an object of cartographic expedition (see “The Lost Continent of Atlantis” in 100 Maps, 218-221).

More recently, and turning East, in 2002 an amateur historian, Gavin Menzies, argued that the chart provided evidence that a Chinese expeditionary fleet had circumnavigated the globe, and along the way discovered ‘Hispaniola’ seventy years before Columbus named it as such. Curators at the James Ford Bell Library at the University of Minnesota where the chart is held have dismissed the existence of ‘Antilia’ accounting for its persistent legend as real due to, well, blank spots on the map that seduce the geographical imagination on all things hidden and exotic. The relevance to Wittgenstein (and Paglen (and Magid)) is one of the observations that led to its disputed existence: ‘Antilia’ is frequent not just throughout historical reference to it as actual, but in its geometric frequency: its outline appears to be iteratively used to give body to other conjectured lands. I suppose the portmanteau is relevant. Rather than challenge Wittgenstein by demonstrating that cartographic searches are possible for both conjectured and as it turned out impossible objects, I have simply restated his argument from the opposite side of his comparison. The island of ‘Antilia’ was a possible object to search for only because it referred to “space itself.” In other words, its search took place from “within a system,” a cartographic and portolan system, locus in quo, in an ‘alias’ - a generalized scheme, or sign, for an unknown.

In Magid’s commission, we can make him tell her that the object of your directive, to find the face of “The Organization” was hidden in a logical impossibility. In the package sent to her Brooklyn studio that provided the redacted manuscript “on cd-rom and in hardcopy,” was also a letter written to her by the AIVD’s Deputy Director General informing her that “six of the eighteen works should exclusively be the property of the AIVD and in no form whatsoever be
circulated, exhibited or reproduced.” It continued, "A recent conversation with an employee who was interviewed by you led to the conclusion that one work should be added to these six works. I apologize for this late adjustment" ("The Bot Letter"). It then listed the seven works to be confiscated, "as identified by their first words":

- He speaks like he is choking...
- He is very tall and looks like Chewbacca...
- He is a tall awkward man with a lopsided frame...
- He seems bigger from afar...
- She has short spiked hair...
- He is thirty eight, tall with sideburns...
- She is the incarnation of the reclining nude...

The letter concludes by giving her permission to "expose the other eleven" (of her "18 spies" series). An approximation indeed - both his quotient of the series, and those exotic little 'Antilias' listed above that I think now I see is what Galileo is pointing toward. Wittgenstein again summarizes:

'What I show reveals what I see'; - in what sense does it do that? The idea is that now you can so to speak look inside me. Whereas I only reveal to you what I see in a game of revealing & hiding which is another played with signs of one category 'direct-indirect'. (Wittgenstein 1997, 148:45v)

Note how the Director referred to the truncated titles as "their words" when in fact these are Magid’s handwritten words, but before that they were her thoughts - her experience. I’m sure Wittgenstein is not revealing that, but the remark seems resolute.

**From seduction to 'counter conduct'**

Contra a field of veridiction, Wittgenstein likens discovery proper as a revelation that hangs in the void - between calculus and prosa - as if "wanting to ask about experiences belonging to a sense organ we don't yet possess." Wittgenstein also rejected a twist that the frog's eye earlier led us to see (Tractatus, 5.631 - 5.6331):

- The thinking, presenting subject; There is no such thing.

If I wrote a book "The world as I found it," I should also have therein to report on my body and say which members obey my will and which do not, etc. This then would be a method of isolating the subject or rather of showing that in an important sense there is no subject: that is to say, of it alone in this book mention could not be made.

The subject does not belong to the world but it is a limit of the world.
Where in the world is a metaphysical to be noted?

You say that this case is altogether like that of the eye and the field of sight. But you do not really see the eye. And from nothing in the field of sight can it be concluded that it is seen from an eye.

For the field of sight has not a form like this:
Figure 2: "For the form of the visual field is surely not like this" (5.6331)
Sheffer published very little in his lifetime, but fills fifty boxes in Harvard's archives. These boxes comprise of writing he possibly cut up from larger manuscripts according to some code known to him in order to prevent his ideas being stolen, probably a disarray of sheets of paper with alternatively handwritten and typescript material, and additional material organized with less coherence. Unlike Magid's novel, it is open to public viewing. Her "Report" in turn evokes Stephané Mallarmé's *Un coup de dés* as a "spaced reading" that is "concealed and resides - takes place" in the blank spaces of the page. In the work's preface, Mallarmé characterized his aim as "the effect of constellation" where the "paper intervenes whenever an image, of its own accord, ceases or recurs" into a series of "prismatic subdivisions of the Idea, the moment of their appearance and their duration". Between Peirce's porous sheet of assertion and Sheffer's emplacing the answer for "whether an accordant code is capable of having a locus" with whatever is actually given is Magid's *Report*:

In *Seduction*, Baudrillard criticized Foucault's work on power for its "positivism" that takes the "the reality and evidence of power" as a given in, for instance, the production of sexuality as a discourse:

> Seduction is stronger than production. It is stronger than sexuality, with which it must never be confused. It is not something internal to sexuality, though this is what it is generally reduced to. It is a circular, reversible process of challenges, one-upmanship and death. It is, on the contrary, sex that is the debased form, circumscribed as it is by the terms of energy and desire. (47)

He continues, insisting that "while still accepting its central hypothesis," one must "turn round what Foucault has to say in" *Lectures on the Will to Know*, because Foucault sees only the production of sex as discourse. He is fascinated by the irreversible deployment and interstitial saturation of a field of speech, which is at the same time the institution of a field of power, culminating in a field of knowledge that reflects (or invents) it. But from whence does power derive its somnambulistic functionality, this irresistible vocation to saturate space? If neither sociality nor sexuality exist unless reclaimed and staged by power, perhaps power too does not exist unless reclaimed and staged by knowledge (theory). In which case, the entire ensemble should be placed in simulation, and this too perfect mirror inverted, even if the "truth effects" it produces are marvelously decipherable. (47-48)

Preferred Baudrillard thinks is to "always wager on simulation and take the signs from behind" (48). In Magid's last meeting at the AIVD, an increasingly heated exchange ensues between her and the housing advisor on the one hand, and the Director of the AIVD and his communications agent on the other. Magid describes losing focus at some point, not paying attention to what is at times being screamed at her. She recalls gradually finding traction in the speech pattern again at first in recognizing only a tonal shift, the Director is for first time speaking to her as an equal. Eventually she finds traction in the semantics of the speech and hears, "We
of being in the thick of it, knowing he will change the course of the story.

Figure 3: *of being in the thick of it, knowing he will change the course of the story*
want you to think of the book as an object of art. We will redact it and put it inside the vitrine with your notebooks where it will remain, permanently.” Magid reiterates what is being suggested, asking, “You want me to put it under glass so that it will no function as a book but as a sculpture?” (183). The director, with a noticeably shift in tone, “implores” her, “Will you consider that, Jill?” In the epilogue to her confiscated novel, she remembers choosing not to answer and thinking,

It is the first time he has truly asked me a question, one person to another, on equal ground. I had never sought to equal him. He was so immense that he was constant, a steady force, an idea emanating from the center of The Building that could not be influenced, only approached, observed, and felt. If the locus of power is fluid, the reflection in a mirror that changes with its context, then I must be changing, too [...] Power is a set of relations. I learned that phrase in an anthropology class at Cornell University titled "Culture and Power." I used it several times in my term papers, but never truly understood it until now. Power is a set of relations, and he just gave his power to me. I know my answer, but choose not to tell him.

Despite his stated departure from Foucault's notion of power, Baudrillard nonetheless seems to evoke the possibility of counter-conduct as a "game of continuous movement":

This is what occurs in the most banal games of seduction: I shy away; it is not you who will give me pleasure, it is I who will make you play, and thereby rob you of your pleasure. A game in continuous movement – one cannot assume that sexual strategies alone are involved. There is, above all, a strategy of displacement (sedere, to take aside, to divert from one's path) that implies a distortion of sex's truth. To play is not to take pleasure. Seduction, as a passion and as a game at the level of the sign, acquires a certain sovereignty; it is seduction that prevails in the long term because it implies a reversible, indeterminate order. (Baudrillard, 22)

Magid recognizes that the director is making do, as if choking..., and simply diffracts, “Instead I say this: I am tired.” (Becoming Tarden, 183; emphasis added).

**Conclusion**

In the preface to Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein seemed to apologize for failing to produce a good book. He spoke of an obligation, “my thoughts were soon crippled if I tried to force them on in any single direction against their natural inclination.” The prose was therefore compelled “to travel over a wide field of thought criss-cross in every direction” traversing “a number of sketches of landscapes which were made in the course of these long and involved journey ings,” backtracking through the “same or almost the same points” in the hope of revisited “afresh from different directions.” The book's expedition would be “marked by all the defects of a weak draughtsman” and ultimately “really only an album.”
Cora Diamond appropriately schematized Wittgenstein’s mature philosophy as a crisscross method that Floyd afforded as a “a tapestry endlessly woven with finite threads, step by step, as in the “crosswise” stitching together of steps in an inductive proof, or recursion” (Floyd 2017:30). Haven’t also arrived at a fitting schema for how Magid lets loose seduction in the city of L, but (perhaps intentionally) lost her directive to find a face between bindings secret, generic and impossible.
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